

T

REMARKS

ON

Mr. ROUSSEAU's EMILIUS:

R

IN WHICH THE

CELEBRATED PROFESSION OF FAITH

OF A

SAVOYARD CURATE,

IS PARTICULARLY CONSIDERED.

Nil magis præstandum est, quam ne, pecorum ritu, sequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes non qua eundem est, sed qua itur.

SEN.

Omni in re quid sit veri videre & tueri decet.

CIC.

L O N D O N :

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M,DCC,LXXXII.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE observations contained in the following sheets were written some time ago, and without any original view to publication. If they should be found by the candid Reader to be just, the author will be the less solicitous to remove the objection that may arise from the lateness of their

a 2

appear-

appearance :— for though death has closed the eyes of ~~Mr.~~ ROUSSEAU, his writings survive; and while a taste for Literature shall remain, or the important business of Education continue to engage public and private attention, EMILIUS will be read and admired.

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REMARKS, &c.

INTRODUCTION.

EDUCATION, in the most comprehensive sense of the word, and that in which the ingenious author of *EMILIUS* justly considers it, is the art of conducting a human being from the earliest infancy to a state of confirmed manhood.

THOUGH, at first sight, a Treatise on Education may seem more immediately to concern those to whom the care of instructing the youth of either sex in those particular exercises or studies which are

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taught

taught at public schools, is committed ; Mr. ROUSSEAU's work will appear, on a nearer and more extensive view, of the greatest consequence to mankind in general, as the subject it treats of materially affects the most important interests of man in his various relations of an animated, a rational, and a social being.

STRENGTH, elegance and perspicuity of style, liveliness of genius, and a profound penetration into human nature, are so happily united in this masterly performance, that it cannot fail to engage that share of attention and admiration it is so justly entitled to, from its various readers. As it not only regards the mental acquirements, but the bodily health of children, it is worthy the serious consideration of those parents who have leisure and ability to judge and determine what means are most conducive to these important purposes.

poses. Instructors of youth ought undoubtedly to be proficient in the particular sciences or languages they undertake to teach, and constantly attentive to the health and morals of the children committed to their care ; but it is the duty of every parent to delineate the *plan* of his children's education ; to inform himself, as far as he is able, what is the best method of imparting that instruction which the genius, the disposition, and the future prospects of each child may render necessary : and when he has, from a minute and particular consideration of these circumstances, formed his plan, much remains for him still to do ; he ought not only to see that it is diligently and steadily persevered in, but to superintend the work himself ; to keep a strict eye upon the conduct of the child, and to be careful that it does not receive its instruction tinctured with the prevailing vices or bad cus-

toms of the age, or country in which he lives.

It is much to be lamented that by far the greater number of parents are, from various causes, incapable of bestowing on the education of their children that degree of attention which the importance of the object demands. From those who are obliged to support their families by continual labour, it is not required; and from the higher order of society, whose pride seems to consist in misapplying their talents, neglecting their most important duties, and degrading their understandings, by a shameful dedication of their lives to every species of folly, dissipation, and extravagance, it cannot be expected. By them, children are considered merely as incumbrances; and they no sooner become parents, than they violate the strongest injunctions of nature, and consign
their

their tender offspring to a nurse, from whom it is transferred to a boarding-school, there to learn the fashionable accomplishments so eminently conspicuous in themselves. Such is the prevailing system of education; though every friend to Britain must rejoice to see there are some illustrious exceptions, amidst this general depravity of manners. The most exalted couple in the kingdom set an example to their subjects which does them the highest honour: but though it is applauded by many, it is imitated by few; while the follies and vices of the great spread, like a contagion, over all ranks and degrees of the community. The middle order of society, equally remote from the fascinating temptations that surround the great, or the unremitting toils attendant on poverty, are inexcusable in their neglect to execute this important trust of superintending the education of youth; which, contemned

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by their superiors, and impossible to be undertaken by their inferiors, is consequently devolved upon them. As the present mode of *female education* is evidently wrong, and in its effects highly prejudicial to the well-being of society ; it is incumbent on parents of either sex, who regard the future happiness of their children, to attempt a speedy reformation by every means in their power. But what reason can there be to hope for so desirable an event, when every Village in the neighbourhood of the Metropolis has its Academies and its Boarding-Schools, where the daughters of tradesmen and mechanics are sent to receive a *genteel education* by their indiscreet parents ; who rejoice in the completion of their wise intention, when their children, having learnt to *burlesque* the accomplishments, and *imitate* the follies and extravagance of their superiors, return home elated with pride on account
of

of their polite acquirements, though totally ignorant of what they ought chiefly to have been instructed in!

It must doubtless afford extreme pleasure to the parents of these young ladies, to hear their perpetual importunities for fashionable ornaments and amusements; or, by way of pleasing variety, to have the boarding-school lessons rehearsed before company, and sit in stupid admiration of a jargon of bad French affectedly jabbered with the insolent complacency of conscious excellence, or barbarous Italian screamed through an unmusical throat, accompanied with the ravishing harmony of unskilful fingers on an untuned harp-fichord!*

LET

* It is certainly very proper that those females who are destined to move in the higher rank of society, and to whom nature has given a genius for

LET us suppose some honest, industrious, sensible young tradesman to have finished his daily employment, and be present at an exhibition of the above kind, perhaps at the house of a neighbouring mechanic, attracted by the fame of the daughter's *accomplishments*, and in search of that important acquisition, a partner for life. How will he be disappointed to find this bewitching charmer abounding with ignorance, pride, folly and extravagance, and destitute of every qualification he would desire in the woman he could think of marrying!

Music, should be taught to excel in so pleasing and so elegant an art; nor is it less so to instruct them in every polite accomplishment which they are capable of learning, and which from their exalted station in life they may justly be expected to possess. But that *indiscriminate* system of female education which now universally prevails, and which regards neither the rank nor the genius of the pupil, is equally pernicious and irrational.

BUT

BUT if the young tradesman, instead of being sensible, should chance to be a fool and a coxcomb, and, by the congenial sympathy of souls, should become enamoured of the fair, and anxious to complete his happiness by uniting with her in matrimony; even in this case, where a match *suitable* in every respect offers, *pride*, either of her parents or her own, probably of both, steps in to forbid the banns. Shall so accomplished, so genteel a girl be thrown away? Shall she wed a *low* tradesman or dirty mechanic? To what purpose have her parents expended so much on her education, but that she should marry to *advantage*? It is true, they have no fortune to give her; but then they have spared no expence in her learning.

It must be evident to every man of common understanding, that this absurd and extravagant mode of female educa-

tion must, in general, produce effects diametrically opposite to the expectation of those parents who, servilely yielding to the tyranny of fashion, pursue a conduct they cannot but condemn. They wish to have their daughters marry to advantage; and to accomplish this end they, often with the greatest difficulty and inconvenience to themselves, give them an education which opposes almost insuperable obstructions to their marrying at all, which makes a matrimonial connection with them *dreaded* by their inferiors, *avoided* by their equals, and *ridiculed* by their superiors; though, if they happen to be distinguished for their beauty, they may probably flaunt, for a short time, the tawdry mistresses of the latter, or become the conceited, helpless, extravagant wives of the former: but if their pride should preserve them from this unhappy alternative, it will lead them to a state of *ancient virginity*,

ginity, which they have always considered as the most disgraceful and contemptible a woman can possibly arrive at. A coquette, soured by disappointments, and condemned by age to enter into a state it has been the study of her life to ridicule and avoid, and who has not acquired one necessary accomplishment to render it supportable, must be *herself* the very object she has constantly despised—a ridiculous, peevish old maid; and it is from the continual accession of such unworthy sisters, that the whole society is unjustly held in derision.

SUCH are the evil consequences that the generality of females must probably experience, from the pernicious and prevailing mode of educating them; though it is allowed there are many instances where strength of understanding and goodness of disposition surmount every obstacle, and

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render their happy possessors the ornaments of their own sex, and the admiration of ours.

BUT the bad effects resulting from this fashionable system of education, far from being confined to the unhappy females, extend their baleful influence over the whole community, and threaten this once flourishing nation with universal ruin. Though, to many, the opinion may seem strange, I am strongly inclined to think, that deluge of political destruction which seems ready to overwhelm us, ultimately proceeds from this apparently inconsiderable source. Hence flow the noxious streams of Dissipation—Matrimonial Infidelity—Luxury and Extravagance, which totally destroy Hospitality—Domestic Happiness—Economy—Generosity—Patriotism—and almost all the public and private virtues for which Britain was formerly

merly illustrious ; and produce in their stead an universal depravity of manners—the most malignant factions in opposition to legal Government, on *one* side—the most bare-faced rapacity, on the *other*—the basest venality and corruption on *both*, aided by every iniquitous practice that insatiable avarice can invent to gratify unbounded prodigality.

THE cause assigned for the production of these dreadful effects is neither insufficient nor remote. It is obvious that the customs, manners, principles and opinions generally prevailing in civil society, depend, in a great measure, on *education*; that its influence increases in exact proportion to the degree of civilization attained by any particular country ; and that in those nations which have acquired the highest, the consequences resulting to the community from the education of
the

the female sex, whether good or bad, must be of the greatest importance; because it is universally esteemed a distinguishing criterion of *politeness* in the men, to recommend themselves to the favourable regard of the women by conforming to their inclination and opinion in dress, in manners, and in numberless customs and modes of living which are comprized in that comprehensive expression *genteel life*.

If this reasoning is admitted to be just, it necessarily follows that in Britain, where the highest degree of civilization prevails, and where the fair-sex consequently claim the most distinguished notice, their education must be an object of the greatest national importance.

THE utmost care should therefore be taken, to inspire their youthful minds with principles of religion and virtue;—

to

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to inure them to early habits of frugality ; to convince them that a neat simplicity in their dress, is far more elegant and pleasing than extravagant finery ; that a proficiency in useful accomplishments, and an obliging behaviour, are essentials of true politeness ; that an ambition to excel in the respectable characters of a wife and a mother, is laudable, and will insure them esteem ; while their endeavours to attract admiration by assuming the airs of a modern fine lady, will expose them to contempt and derision.

VITIATED as the minds of my fair countrywomen are, by the present pernicious mode of education, and by the universal dissipation and depravity of manners which are its necessary consequences, there are very few girls of common understanding who would refuse the addresses of Mr. ROUSSEAU's amiable Pupil ; but

those who aspire to gain the heart of an EMILIUS, must emulate the character of his SOPHIA; whom he did not select from the votaries of pleasure, or seek in crowded assemblies, amidst the glare and pageantry which luxury administers to folly, but in the calm retreat of domestic felicity, in the house of her parents; where he found her possessed of charms to engage his affection, and endowed with accomplishments to insure his happiness.

It requires no great degree of penetration to discover the important and beneficial effects produced by the education of SOPHIA on the mind of EMILIUS; for though the instructions and the unremitting care of his Preceptor formed the basis of his future character, the virtues of his Mistress, and his attachment to her, were indispensably necessary to complete the work.

BUT

BUT the following remarks on EMILIUS are by no means intended as an analysis of that elaborate performance; nor does the writer of them presume to determine how far it may be eligible or even practicable to adopt Mr. ROUSSEAU's System of Education; or what alterations it must undergo to accommodate it to the time and country we live in, and render it of general utility.—His only design is, to point out a few of those passages which in his opinion contain the most striking sentiments and remarkable observations, at the same time that he proposes his objections to such parts of the work as he apprehends to be particularly exceptionable.

It is hoped the candid reader will exclude the desultory unconnected form of this Essay from the list of its imperfections, when he reflects that its appearance in such a state is the necessary consequence
of

18 I N T R O D U C T I O N .

of a plan abrupt, detached, and irregular ;
and that he will consider himself in the
light of a traveller passing through a strag-
gling village, where he cannot expect to
meet with the order and symmetry of a
well-built city.

REMARKS

R E M A R K S

O N T H E

F I R S T , V O L U M E *.

EVERY attentive reader of *EMILIUS* must admire the author's sagacious and penetrating researches into human nature; but at the same time he cannot avoid being sometimes disgusted with strange inconsistencies. We are informed, for example, in the 4th page of this volume, "that we are born stupid and
 "have need of understanding, and that
 "all we are not possessed of at our birth,
 "and which we require when we are grown
 "up, is bestowed on us by education;"

* See ROUSSEAU'S "*EMILIUS and SOPHIA*,"
 4 vols. 12mo. printed for T. Becket, in the Strand.

yet,

yet, in direct contradiction to this assertion, Mr. ROUSSEAU gives* a very remarkable instance of quick sensibility expressed by a child in its tenderest infancy, and adds, “ this example alone would have convinced me (if I could ever have doubted it) of an *innate* sense of right and wrong being implanted in the human heart.” This inference is certainly just, but how can it be reconciled with the author’s assertion above quoted, “ that we all are *born stupid*?” He cannot surely maintain, that an infant is, at the same time, a being of innate stupidity and innate sensibility !

THE general plan of *infant* education (which begins at the birth of the child) appears exceedingly rational ; though in some instances liable to objection, and perhaps in many impossible to be carried

* Page 70.

into execution, by the *male* parent or governor. Nature and custom are thus far consistent, that in the most uncivilized, as well as the politest nations, the care and management of the child, in its infant state, is constantly assigned to the female; though it is certainly the province of the father, or male governor, to see that this important duty is properly discharged: but we do not find from history, that the child of CARO, or the grand-children of AUGUSTUS, derived any peculiar advantages from the *minute* attention which Mr. ROUSSEAU informs us those illustrious Romans bestowed on their nurseries *.

HE makes a very just distinction between the *petitioning* and *commanding* cries of infants; and gives proper directions how each should be regarded †. His

* Page 31. † Page 75.

rules for the management of children * are well worthy the attentive consideration of parents. His observations on the diffuse and even studied neglect of *accent* in the conversation of the *polite*, though not much to their honour, are exceedingly just †. “Necessity that children should
 “sometimes feel pain, in order that they
 “may be inured to encounter the evils
 “of life” [and that they may learn to commiserate the sufferings of their fellow-creatures ‡.] “The happiness of
 “man, in his present state, is merely
 “*negative*, and must be estimated by the
 “least quantity of his sufferings §.

THIS approaches nearly to the doctrine of EPICURUS, who maintained that there is no medium between pleasure and pain; but that privation of pain is itself the high-

* Page 79. † Page 90. ‡ Page 96. § Page 102.

est degree of pleasure.—*Itaque non placuit EPICURUS medium esse quiddam, inter dolorem & voluptatem: illud enim ipsum, quod quibusdam medium videtur, cum omni dolore caret, non modo voluptatem esse, verum etiam summam voluptatem.* Cic. But it would be equally rational to assert, that privation of pleasure is the highest degree of pain; and if this is admitted, it must follow that a human being who by native stupidity, or by frequent intoxication should be reduced to a state of idiotism, would at the same time *enjoy* the greatest happiness, and *suffer* the extreme misery; *because* he would be equally insensible of pleasure and pain.—This state of “lazy apathy” may by men of indolent phlegmatic dispositions be called *ease*; but surely the existence of a rational creature who merely *receives* ideas by the different organs of sensation, without being *affected* by them, is but
one

one degree above vegetation. Such a being, which neither suffers nor enjoys, cannot be accounted either miserable or happy.

MR. ROUSSEAU seems to be mistaken in maintaining, “ that every idea of future
 “ pleasure is *painful*, because it is inse-
 “ parable from the desire of enjoying it.”
 “ Every desire (says he) supposes the *pri-*
 “ *vation or absence* of the object desired,
 “ and this circumstance is always in some
 “ degree painful *.” He supposes the
 ideas of privation and absence to be sy-
 nonymous, though they are in the case here
 stated totally different; and in this mis-
 conception the fallacy of his reasoning
 consists.—For privation being the *loss* of
 what we *formerly* possessed, must always
 have a retrospect to scenes or objects of *past*
 enjoyment, accompanied with a certain
 conviction that they *cannot* be recalled;

* Page 103.

and this idea must always excite melancholy reflections. Absence, when it has reference to past transactions (as the separation of friends, or similar circumstances) may, and often does cause *painful* reflections; but even in these instances it is by no means synonymous to *privation*: nor can the effects produced on the human mind by these different ideas be equal; since the first supposes only a *temporary*, but the latter a *total* loss of a former enjoyment. But in the sentence above quoted from EMILIUS, the words *privation* and *absence*, which are used as synonymous terms, convey ideas diametrically opposite; because *absence* *there* clearly refers to something *future*, which *privation* never can. It cannot therefore be true, as Mr. ROUSSEAU maintains, "that every desire "supposes the absence or *privation* of the "object desired," since the idea of *privation*, from whence the painful reflection

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would

would arise, cannot extend to any *future* object.—No man *can* be *deprived* of that which he *never* possessed; though it is allowed, that the good he expects in future is *absent* from him: but the idea of absence, when accompanied with the *hope* of obtaining the object of his wish, will excite in his mind sensations of a very different nature from those which are caused by the united ideas of absence and privation.

THE *expectation* of enjoying pleasure may be consistent with the *desire*; and in the expectation of future enjoyments consists one of the greatest actual pleasures of human life.—The satisfaction arising to ALEXANDER from his conquest of the world, was not occasioned by his *real* triumphs and victories, but derived from those he *expected* in future to gain: for we find he wept because he had no *more* worlds to conquer; or, in other words, because

cause he had *no future prospects of felicity* to contemplate. ALEXANDER therefore derived present happiness from the expectation of future good; and notwithstanding it may contradict Mr. ROUSSEAU'S system, it is uncontrovertibly true, that the *absence* of the object desired, so far from being painful, was the real source of ALEXANDER'S happiness; and he justly considered it in this light, when he *wept* because he had no future conquests to *expect*.

FROM page 104 to 112 we meet with excellent moral and philosophical reflections on the nature and condition of man. Mr. ROUSSEAU justly maintains, "that true
 "happiness consists in restraining our
 "wants and desires within the limits of our
 "abilities; and that the imaginary wants
 "of man, in a social state, are the chief causes of his unhappiness."—"The affluent

“ and powerful are mere *infants* in society, yet continually boasting of the services they exact from others by means of their wealth; though this dependence on the labours of others is the greatest proof of their own *real weakness* *.” The author of *EMILIUS* disapproves of the practice of reasoning with children, recommended by the great Mr. LOCKE, though his arguments do not appear to be by any means conclusive; for it is as great an absurdity to suppose a child of 10 years old incapable of being convinced by reasoning in *any* instance, as it would be to imagine him capable of it in *all*. The fact is, that the generality of children, at that age, *are* susceptible of conviction by rational arguments in very many instances; and our immortal countryman’s method of reasoning with them is certainly right; though like other gene-

* Page 114.

ral rules it may be liable to some exceptions. But it cannot escape the observation of the attentive reader, that there are in EMILIUS many rather illiberal sarcasms against Mr. LOCKE *, to whom ROUSSEAU (notwithstanding his acknowledged abilities) is not to be compared.

SEVERE restraints on children naturally lead them to unbridled licentiousness, when absent from their Governours †. A remarkable instance of terror excited in the author by darkness ‡. He very properly advises that children should be accustomed to be left in darkness, to divest them of the natural propensity to fear proceeding from it; and proposes some diversions to render it agreeable to them §. He seems to be greatly mistaken in asserting || that “ children have no *emphasis*

* One in particular in page 196 of this first volume.

† Page 133. ‡ Page 243. § Page 245. || Page 275.

“ in their verbal conversation:” for in fact children have, on most occasions, a more strong, just, and natural expression and emphasis than adults. That they have it even in their earliest infancy, is evident from the author’s own observation, when he distinguishes between their *petitioning* and *commanding* cries; for the difference arises intirely from the particular *emphasis* with which they are uttered by the child, who in this kind of inarticulate speech as evidently expresses the passions of his mind, as the most applauded actor can do by studied elocution; and even on the stage we often see *art* exceeded by nature. The unaffected emphasis and expression of a child has frequently been known to draw tears from the audience, when the laboured exertions of a man have failed to produce that effect. By mixing with society and acquiring what is called politeness, children learn to *disguise* the native sentiments

sentiments of their minds, and consequently lose much of that emphasis which was intended by nature to convey them ; and it is worthy of observation, that the nearer man approaches to a state of nature, the more of this emphasis he retains : thus the Indian has more than the English peasant, he more than the courtier, and all degrees of men, when their passions are violently agitated, and they are thus put off their guard, have more than at other times.



“GLUTTONY, in grown persons, is the
“vice of those who have no heart*.”
Though an *unjust* and *illiberal* reflection
on the whole British Nation would hardly
have been expected from a man of Mr.
ROUSSEAU'S dispassionate and philosophical
turn of mind ; yet he informs his readers,
“* that the English barbarity is well

* Page 284.

“ known :” and this indiscriminate charge of cruelty against our country is the more extraordinary, as the *reverse* is known to be the fact; witness our humane treatment of conquered enemies and prisoners taken in war, and our numerous public edifices erected for the benefit of our suffering fellow-creatures. All national reflections, even though they may be founded in truth, are illiberal; nor ought we to cast a stigma on the French nation, on account of the dreadful *massacre* in the reign of Charles the IXth; though it may be remarked, to the honour of England, that its annals cannot furnish a *counterpart* to the St. BARTHOLOMEW *Night-Piece**.

A very

* See a full and minute account of this horrid transaction in the Memoirs of M. de SULLY.

It may be urged in vindication of Mr. ROUSSEAU, that he had not visited England till some years after he had written his *EMILIUS*; and that foreigners
are

A very nervous and beautiful quotation from PLUTARCH † against the practice of eating animal food, which, though repugnant to nature, abhorrent to reflection, and indispensable by argument, is rendered indispensably necessary, and even agreeable, by

are apt to draw general conclusions from particular practices.—Thus if we are told of a People who have great pleasure in the brutal customs of Bull-baiting and Cock-fighting, we should say of such a People that they were not far advanced in civilization — perhaps that they were barbarous.—While therefore those usages were in repute among us, Mr. ROUSSEAU'S assertion was not entirely unfounded ; but, to the honour of our Nation, the former of these customs exists no longer ; and the latter is confined to a small proportion of the little and the great Vulgar—to drunken mechanics and peasants, and to a few of the debauched nobility ; men who, in this instance among others, are a disgrace to their rank, and to human nature itself.

† Page 290.

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† Page

by the fascinating and resistless tyranny of custom.—A fine comparison of the different ages of the life of Man to the several seasons of the year †. “Habit owes
“great part of its influence to indolence,
“hence stronger in old and idle persons
“than in young and active ones §.”

MR. ROUSSEAU concludes this Volume with a very engaging description of his ideal pupil.

† Page 299. § Page 302.

REMARKS

R E M A R K S

O N T H E

S E C O N D V O L U M E .

IN the 5th Page of this volume the author maintains, “that the *reverse* of “every false proposition is *true*, and that “the source of truth must [consequently] “be as inexhaustible as that of error.” But this position contains a palpable absurdity ; because truth is in its nature *simple*, and incapable of *variation* ; but errors may be multiplied and varied *ad infinitum*. One example may suffice to prove that Mr. ROUSSEAU’s premises are wrong, and that the *reverse* of every false proposition is *not* true. Polytheism was maintained by the antients, though it is now justly and universally

verfally exploded by all men endued with common fenfe; this propofition therefore is *false*; and, reasoning on Mr. ROUSSEAU's principles, it muft neceffarily follow, that *atheifm*, which is the *reverse* of polytheifm, is *true*; a conclufion which no man of underftanding can admit.

THE author's method of inftructing children in Geography, Astronomy, &c. rather by an actual furvey of the heavens and the earth, than by globes and orreries, is certainly very rational; and his obfervation is perfectly juft, “ that the “ formidable and complicated apparatus “ of inftruction are rather more likely to “ frighten a child from learning, or to attract “ his attention to the inftruments them- “ felves, than to convey inftruction, or ad- “ vance his real knowledge.” But in many inftances the *real* knowledge of the moft profound philofopher goes but a very little way

way beyond that of a child. The following example, from EMILIUS, will prove the truth of this observation. The author supposes himself to be in the fields, with his pupil; and having let a stone fall from his hand he asks EMILIUS, "Why does
 "the stone fall? EMILIUS (he says) would
 "readily conceive the difficulty of his
 "question, though an ordinary child would
 "not; but would immediately answer,
 "The stone falls because it is *heavy*. And
 "what is heavy? (replies ROUSSEAU.)
 "The thing that falls, says the child.
 "So the stone falls, *because it falls*; and
 "here ends the philosophy of the child."
 —Let us now see how far Mr. ROUSSEAU,
 or even Sir ISAAC NEWTON himself, could
 in this instance exceed the child's philosophy. Instead of concluding the dialogue as above, the child and philosopher may be supposed to continue it thus.—

CHILD. You seem dissatisfied with the
reason

reason I assigned for the falling of the stone.

ROUSSEAU. You did not assign any reason; you only said the stone fell because it was *heavy*, or, in other words, *because it fell*: but you did not explain the *cause* why heaviness should *make* it fall.

CH. I request that explanation from you.

Ro. The stone falls to the ground by the *attraction of gravitation*, by which all bodies tend to the center of the earth.

CH. What is the attraction of gravitation?

Ro. It is a power, or property, inherent in every particle of matter.

CH. I do not ask you *where* it resides, I want to know *what it is*.

Ro. I told you, just now, it was that power by which all bodies are attracted, or drawn towards each other in proportion to their solid contents; and consequently the stone, being the less, to the earth, as the greater body.

CH.

CH. This is only *repeating* what you said before ; but I ask you *how* these bodies became possessed of this power, or property of attraction ; or, *what is the cause of it ?*

Ro. You ask me a question which the greatest of philosophers confessed he was *unable* to answer.

CH. Then what information have I gained, or how am I *now* better able to assign the *cause* of the stone's falling to the earth, than I was before ? The difference between your *philosophy* and my *childish ignorance*, seems merely to consist in the *name* by which we call the *unknown cause*. I say, the stone falls by reason of its heaviness, while you assert that it falls by the power of attraction ; but as it seems you can no better explain the *cause* of *attraction* than I can that of *heaviness*, we both agree in ascribing the effect to an *unknown cause* ; and our conclusion is the same, " the stone falls, *because it falls.*"

GOD,

GOD, whose infinite wisdom and power created all things, animate and inanimate, has involved the *latent* springs by which he actuates them in impenetrable obscurity ; and the keenest researches of the wisest of men into these secrets of the Almighty Architect and Director of the universe, must terminate in the utter confusion of their pride, and the thorough conviction of their limited capacities.—*Latent ista omnia crassis occultata & circumfusa tenebris : ut nulla acies humani ingenii tanta sit, quæ penetrare in cælum, terram intrare possit.* CIC.

THAT profound and accurate reasoner Mr. WOLLASTON takes occasion to make many just and pertinent observations on the limited extent of our capacities, in “ The Religion of Nature delineated.” The following quotation is so applicable to the present occasion, so convincing and profound

found in its reasoning, so sublime and animated in its style, that I cannot forbear inserting it, however I may *depreciate* my performance by suffering any thing so incomparably superior in every respect, to appear in it.

“ THE frame and constitution of the
 “ world, the astonishing magnificence of
 “ it, the various phænomena and kinds of
 “ beings, the uniformity observed in the
 “ production of things, the uses and ends
 “ for which they serve, &c. do all shew
 “ that there is some Almighty designer,
 “ an infinite wisdom and power at the top
 “ of all these things : such marks there are
 “ of both. Or God is that being without
 “ whom such a frame or constitution of
 “ the world, such a magnificence in it, &c.
 “ could not be. In order to prove to any
 “ one the *grandness* of this fabric of the
 “ world, one needs only to bid him con-
 “ sider

“sider the *Sun*, with that insupportable
 “lustre and glory that furrounds it : to de-
 “monstrate the vast *distance, magnitude*, and
 “*heat* of it : to represent to him the *cho-*
 “*rus of Planets moving* periodically, by
 “uniform laws, in their several orbits
 “about it ; affording a regular variety of
 “aspects ; guarded, some of them by se-
 “condary planets, and as it were emu-
 “lating the state of the *Sun* ; and pro-
 “bably all possess by proper *inhabitants* * :
 “to remind him of those surprising visits

* MR. WOLLASTON'S opinion that the planets
 are inhabited, is extremely rational ; and was main-
 tained by some of the ancients, as it is by most mo-
 dern philosophers, as will appear from the following
 quotation : *Habitari ait Xenocrates in Luna, eamque*
esse terram multarum urbium & montium. CIC. The
 same author takes occasion to observe, that the doc-
 trines of the earth's motion and of the Antipodes
 were well known in his time, though he seems by
 no means inclined to believe them himself.

“ the

“ the *Comets* make us ; the large trains or
 “ uncommon splendor which attend them ;
 “ the far country they come from ; and the
 “ curiosity and horror they excite not only
 “ among us, but in the inhabitants of other
 “ planets, who may also be up to see the entry
 “ and progress of these ministers of fate : to
 “ direct his eye and contemplation through
 “ those azure fields and vast regions above
 “ him, up to the *fixt stars*, that radiant
 “ numberless host of heaven ; and to make
 “ him understand how unlikely a thing it is,
 “ that they should be placed there only to
 “ adorn and bespangle a canopy over our
 “ heads (though that would be a great
 “ piece of magnificence too) and much
 “ less to supply the places of so many glow-
 “ worms, by affording a feeble light to
 “ our earth, or even to all our fellow-
 “ planets : to convince him, that they are
 “ rather *so many other Suns*, with their
 “ several regions and sets of planets about
 “ them :

“ them: to shew him, by the help of
 “ glasses, still more and more of these
 “ fixt lights, and to beget in him an ap-
 “ prehension of their unaccountable *num-*
 “ *bers*, and of those *immense spaces* that lie
 “ retired beyond our *utmost* reach, and
 “ even imagination: I say, one needs
 “ but do this, and explain to him such
 “ things as are now known almost to every
 “ body; and by it to shew, that if the
 “ world be not infinite, it is *infinito similis*,
 “ and therefore surely a *magnificent* struc-
 “ ture, and the work of an *infinite* architect.
 “ —But if we could take a view of all the
 “ *particulars* contained within that astonish-
 “ ing compass which we have thus hasti-
 “ ly run over, how would wonders multi-
 “ ply upon us? Every scene and part of
 “ the world is as it were made up of *other*
 “ worlds. If we consider this *our seat* (I
 “ mean this earth), what scope is here for
 “ admiration! What variety of moun-
 “ tains,

“ tains, hills, valleys, plains, rivers, seas,
 “ trees, plants ! the many tribes of
 “ different *animals* with which it is stocked !
 “ the multifarious *inventions* and *works* of
 “ one of these ; that is, of us *Men*, &c.
 “ And yet, when all these are surveyed
 “ as *nicely* as they can be by the
 “ help of our unassisted senses, and even
 “ of telescopical glasses, by the assistance
 “ of good *microscopes* in very *small* parts
 “ of matter, as many *new* wonders may
 “ perhaps be discovered, as those already
 “ observed ; new *kingdoms* of animals ;
 “ new *architecture* and curiosity of work.
 “ So that as before our senses and even
 “ conception fainted in those *vast journeys*
 “ we were obliged to take in considering
 “ the expanse of the universe ; so here
 “ again they fail us in our research into
 “ the *principles* and constituent parts of it.”
 “ —Both the *beginnings* and *ends* of things,
 “ the *least* and the *greatest*, all conspire to
 “ baffle

“ baffle us ; and which way soever we pro-
 “ secute our inquiries, we still fall in with
 “ *fresh* subjects for amazement, and *fresh*
 “ reasons to believe that there are inde-
 “ finitely still *more* and *more* behind, that
 “ will for ever escape our eagrest pursuits
 “ and deepest penetration.

“ THIS mighty *building* is not only thus
 “ grand, and the appearances stupendous
 “ in it, but the *manner* in which things are
 “ effected is commonly *unintelligible*, and
 “ their causes *too profound* for us. There
 “ are indeed many things in nature, which
 “ we know ; and some of which we *seem*
 “ to know the *causes* : but alas ! how *few*
 “ are these, with respect to the whole
 “ sum ? And the causes which we assign,
 “ what are they ? Commonly such, as can
 “ only be expressed in general terms,
 “ whilst the *bottoms* of things lie undis-
 “ covered. Such, as have been collected

“ from *experience*, but could scarcely be
 “ known before hand, by any arguments
 “ *à priori*, to be capable of rendering such
 “ effects : and yet till causes are known
 “ after that manner, they are not *thoroughly*
 “ understood. Such, as seem disproportion-
 “ ationate and *too little*, and are so insuffici-
 “ ent and unsatisfactory, that one cannot
 “ but be inclined to think, that something
 “ *immaterial* and *invisible* must be imme-
 “ diately concerned. In short, we know,
 “ many times, that such a thing will have
 “ such an effect, or perhaps that such an
 “ effect is produced by such a cause ; but
 “ the manner *how* we know not, or but
 “ grossly, and if such an *hypothesis* be true.
 “ It is impossible for us to come at the
 “ true *principles* of things, or to see into
 “ the œconomy of the *finest* part of nature,
 “ and workings of the *first* springs. The
 “ *causes* that appear to us, are but *effects*
 “ of other causes : the *vessels* of which the
 “ bodies

“ bodies of plants and animals consist, are
 “ made up of *other smaller* vessels: and the
 “ subtlest parts of matter which we have
 “ any notion of (as animal spirits or par-
 “ ticles of light) have their parts, and
 “ may, for aught we know, be *compound*
 “ bodies: and as to the *substances* them-
 “ selves of all these things, and their *in-*
 “ *ternal constitution*, they are hid from our
 “ eyes. Our philosophy dwells in the
 “ surface of nature*.”

ATTRACTION, Solidity, Extension, Mo-
 tion, Time, Space, Thought, Volition,
 are known to us *merely* by their *effects*; but
 of their *essences* or *causes*, mankind are *now*,
 and probably will always be, totally ig-
 norant. They are among the arcana of
 nature, and philosophers appear to mistake
 their talents when they attempt to explain

* Religion of Nature Delineated, page 81 and
 82. 4to. Edit. 1724.

them

them. Providence has assigned to the human understanding, limits which it cannot pass; and included in these bounds, whatever is necessary for man to know: they may indeed be much too narrow for human *pride*, but they will always be found sufficiently extensive for human wisdom. The province of the small portion of intelligence assigned us, (which man, to please his vanity, dignifies with the name of *philosophy*) certainly is, to investigate *effects*, rather than *causes*. In this "ample field," many useful and important discoveries have been, and doubtless many more still may be made. Thus, though the *cause* of that property inherent in matter, to which philosophers have given the name of *attraction*, is unknown, and perhaps *unknowable*, to us in this imperfect state of our existence, its *effects* are apparent; and the various modes and ratios of its operation have been well ascertained. From the calculation of

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these,

these, the most important and amazing discoveries have been made. Every step we advance, we receive additional light; while we increase our knowledge, we abate our pride, and look up with reverential awe to the great Creator and *first cause* of all things.

BUT there is a certain class of men, calling themselves Philosophers, who, as POPE expresses it,

“ Boldly take the high *priori* road,

“ And reason *downward*, till they doubt a God.”

“ IT is weak and childish (say they) to
 “ decry human reason, which is able to
 “ assign the *causes* of all things; we will
 “ not believe what we cannot account for;
 “ it is derogatory to the dignity of human
 “ nature to be confined to the investiga-
 “ tion of *effects*; we will explore the *causes*
 “ of them. It is *pretended* all things were
 “ originally

“originally created by an eternal, infi-
 “nite, self-existent Being. The ideas of
 “eternity and infinity we cannot *compre-*
 “*bend*, and that of self-existence is a flat
 “*contradiction* to our reason; we cannot
 “therefore believe what appears to our
 “infallible guide, absurd and inconsis-
 “tent; and we deny the existence of
 “that incomprehensible Power which
 “blind credulity asserts to be the cause
 “of all things.”

SUCH must be the doctrine of those who
 are determined to believe no more than
 their limited capacity can *comprehend*; and
 this doctrine must lead them not only to
 atheism, but to the greatest absurdities of
 scepticism, even to the doubting *their own*
existence. For it is certainly *much more*
 repugnant to human reason to believe,
 that an organized material being, limited
 in duration, and yet endued with the power

of thinking, should exist *without* a cause, or be *itself* the *cause* of its *own* existence, than it is to assert that an almighty Creator *does exist*, and has existed from all eternity; though the mode of his existence is incomprehensible to us, his *finite* creatures. But how much more evident does the absurdity of *atheism*, and the vanity of human reason appear, when we view “the heavens” which declare the glory of God, and “the firmament which sheweth his handy-work;” when we see the almighty Creator in the stupendous effects of his infinite wisdom and power, and an universe of created beings conspire to prove his existence, and confound the ridiculous arrogance of *atheistical* scepticism!

MR. ROUSSEAU gives a very just and concise explication of the original use of Money among civilized nations, as the sign or common measure of wealth.

wealth *. Sensible reflections on the comparative utility of the polite arts and laborious occupations ; with a just conclusion, “ that those employments which are
 “ generally accounted the *meanest*, are in
 “ reality the most worthy of estimation,
 “ and those by which any individual in
 “ civil society is most likely to gain an
 “ *independent* subsistence †.”

A VERY just distinction between self-love and self-interest : “ the soft and affection-
 “ ate passions arise from the former, the
 “ hateful and irascible ones from the lat-
 “ ter ‡.” Mr. POPE has adopted this opi-
 nion of the beneficial influence of self-love over the passions, in his Essay on Man, and he supports it with great strength of argument and sublimity of poetry §.

* Page 72 to 76. † Page 92 to 98. ‡ Page 114.

§ See Epistle II. beginning at these lines :

“ Two principles in human nature reign ;
 “ Self-love to urge, and reason to restrain, &c.”

“*True love*, or a sincere undeviating
“ attachment to *one* object, is a sure
“ means of preserving the passions within
“ due bounds *.”

AN attachment of this kind, fixed on a
proper object, is what every considerate and
affectionate parent would wish to encourage
in a child of either sex, but especially
in the *male*; for at the age in which this
passion usually commences, the future character
of the *man* is formed; and *true love*
becomes in the youth the source of every
virtue that can actuate the human soul,
if its object is *virtuous*. This word is here
to be understood in its most comprehensive
meaning, and in that sense it includes all
that a wise parent would require. Rank,
birth, fortune, and that tribe of fashionable
trifles which folly includes in the list
of female accomplishments, are, in com-

* Page 143.

parison of a virtuous disposition improved by education, "but empty tinsel ornaments." Nay, they are more likely to be hurtful than beneficial to the mind of the young lover. He *emulates* that character he thinks his mistress will approve. If she is endued with humility and discretion, his attire will be plain though neat; his conversation manly, open, and sincere; he will use no ornaments in his address to her, but the native and resistless eloquence of an impassioned heart; his behaviour to all with whom he is acquainted will be unconstrained and engaging; he will be unreserved to his equals, respectful, though not meanly submissive, to his superiors, and humanely courteous to his inferiors; or rather, he will consider *all* men as his *equals by nature*, and pay as small a tribute as possible to the minions of fortune, or the *tyranny* of custom. The virtuous passion which possesses his soul, will extend

its influence over all his conduct, and has this remarkable advantage above most other motives of action, that every effect it produces is beneficial ; it softens the mind without emasculating it ; and while it tends to nourish the virtues, it acts with equal efficacy in eradicating the vices incident to human nature*.

WHATEVER the lover imagines his mistress will approve, he endeavours not only to perform, but to *excel* in ; and as his passion prompts him to magnify her virtues and extenuate her failings, it will probably produce the same effect on his own. But it is necessary to observe, that the *lover's* ideas of virtue and perfection are very different from those of the philosopher. The object of his passion is his model of excellence ; his ideas of virtues and vices derive their existence from her *infallible* ex-

* Every attentive reader of *EMILIUS* will observe that he derived from his *passion for Sophia*, most of the amiable qualifications he was possessed of.

ample and opinion. If his mistress, elated with the supposed advantages of birth, fortune, beauty, &c. or corrupted by the mean adulation which are their constant attendants, should assume an *haughty fantastical* behaviour, the man who is fool enough to *be* her lover, or knave enough to feign a passion for her, will enroll her follies in the catalogue of her virtues, and endeavour to gain her favour by imitating, and if possible by exceeding, her ridiculous foibles.

FROM the irrational mode of educating the youth of both sexes, and the absurd pride of parents, prompting them to make all their children ladies and gentlemen, most certainly arise all the fopperies and extravagant follies that transform our women to idiots and our men to fribbles; and expose them to the pity or contempt of every human being who still re-

tains the appearance or rationality of a man. The levelling principle of *fashion*, which now universally prevails over all ranks of civil society, and which suffers no individual whom it actuates to rest contented in the station assigned him by Providence, will in time produce the most pernicious effects in every civilized nation where it is permitted to operate unrestrained. Whether its progress will be impeded in this country by any thing short of some great *public misfortune*, I do not pretend to determine; but if education was conducted, as nearly as possible, on the rational plan recommended by the ingenious author of *EMILIUS*, it might in all probability be attended with the most beneficial consequences. It would inspire the minds of the rising generation with a desire to excel in those *real* accomplishments which their several stations in society require; and excite a just contempt for pomp, luxury, riches,

riches, vanity, and every absurd idea comprehended under those complex and indefinite terms, *fashion, bon ton, high life, &c.* That they are compounded of principles inimical to civil society, and even incompatible with the existence of government, will evidently appear from the following considerations.

IN a state of nature, such as is supposed by philosophers *some-where* to exist, all men are *equal*; that is, no one has a *right* to controul the actions of another; but each may exercise, in what manner he pleases, the powers and faculties he possesses. *Equality* here means nothing more than *absolute* independence, or liberty, in its utmost extent; and it is undoubtedly true, that in a state of nature all men are *thus far equal*; but in mental and corporeal powers, perhaps no two men ever have been, or ever will be created *exactly equal*.

From this physical *inequality* arises the necessity of *deviating* from the state of nature, to that of artificial or civil society; in which the superior mental or corporeal powers of individuals are restrained from being prejudicial to their fellow-creatures. All civil society owes its existence to *subordination*; for whether it is at first established by the oppressive violence of tyranny, or by the voluntary consent of those who originally formed its constitution, with a view to the benefit of the *whole* community; it must, in either case, be maintained and supported by *laws*: and though in *small* societies there is a possibility that every member may be a *legislator*, and give his assent to those laws by which he is to be governed, yet even this will not exclude subordination and subjection. For laws must be *executed*, else they are made to no purpose. Penalties and punishments must succeed the *violation*

of laws ; but if the assent of every member of the community is necessary to inflict the *punishment*, as well as to enact the law, the *convict* must himself be his *own judge*, and pronounce his *own* condemnation ! If therefore the legislative power is supposed to be vested in the *whole* body of the people, there is an absolute necessity that the *executive power* should be committed to one, or to a certain number of individuals ; and though the trust need not be always delegated to the *same* persons, the executive power, wherever it resides, must be *supreme* ; else how should it be obeyed ? For if all men are equal, all have an *equal right* to refuse obedience ; and what kind of *government* must that be, which no one is obliged to obey ?

SUPREME power necessarily implies *superiority* in its possessor ; and where it is exercised, *equality* exists no longer, and
subordi-

subordination immediately arises. Such must be the state of all civil communities. But to return to the subject of *Fashion*.

THE *opinions* of mankind in general are as liable to follow the variations of the mode, as their external ornaments.

A GENERAL *levelling* principle, and a consequent contempt of those who are placed in superior stations, is as much the prevailing *fashion* of the present time in this country, as the buttons on our coats, the buckles on our shoes, or that stupendous structure which our modern belles think proper to carry on their *heads*.—All ranks and degrees endeavour to exalt themselves by *depressing* and trampling upon their superiors; and to effect this laudable purpose, the characters and persons of those to whom the executive power of government is intrusted, are marked out as proper

per objects for indiscriminate slander and abuse : it is deemed a *crime* or *weakness* not to suppose a — or a minister to be a compound of *folly* and *wickedness*.

THE universal cry is, that the *morals* of the people are *corrupt*, and that *religion* has no longer any influence over them.

THESE, it must be confessed, are melancholy *truths*; though the fault does not originate with the body of the *people*, but with their superiors. Incapable themselves of much reflection, the bulk of the community form their manners and opinions by *imitation*. *Fashion* is with them a sufficient inducement for almost any mode of conduct; and daily experience evinces their most powerful motives to be a desire of being fashionable, and a fear of being ridiculous.—They see dissipation, luxury, and every kind of extravagance pervade

pervade the *higher* ranks of society, and a contempt of religion and virtue manifestly conspicuous in the principles and practice even of many whose *profession* should oblige them to be instructors of the public, both by *example* and *precept*. When “men in high and holy stations” act amiss, their rank is an aggravation of the offence; and the exalted place they thus unworthily occupy, instead of protecting them from disgrace, becomes itself infamous and contemptible, through the shameful behaviour of its possessors. Thus all regard to *subordination* is nearly lost; and the only respect the lower class of the people now shew to the higher, is a *servile* imitation of its vices and follies.

VERY sensible and deep reflections on the nature and condition of man: “His
“weakness and wants render him social
“and humane, and the degree of felicity
“he

“ he enjoys, proceeds from his depen-
 “ dence*.” The absurd maxim “ that all
 “ men have an equal degree of happi-
 “ nefs,” confuted and juſtly ridiculed †.
 “ Mirth, a very equivocal ſign of happi-
 “ nefs ‡.”

“ WHAT we too often *behold* we
 “ ceaſe to *imagine*, and it is in ima-
 “ gination only, that we feel the miſe-
 “ ries of others §.” “ Ingratitude would
 “ be more rare, if benefits *on uſury* were
 “ leſs common ||.” “ Reason, indepen-
 “ dent of conſcience, would be unable to
 “ eſtabliſh any one natural law **.” “ Our
 “ coteremporaries *expoſe* their words, and
 “ conceal their actions ††.” “ Historical
 “ criticism is the art of ſelecting from
 “ many *lies*, that which bears the neareſt

* Page 160. † Page 172. ‡ Page 182. § Page 187.
 || Page 195. ** Page 197. †† Page 204.

“ reſem-

“resemblance to truth*.” “War is generally nothing more than a manifestation of events already determined by moral causes, of which Historians are ignorant †.”—This sentiment is exemplified in the present war; the rebellion in America, with which it began, being nothing more than the *effects* of several remote *causes co-operating* to produce that event. Modern historians justly censured for not introducing familiar anecdotes of their Heroes in private life. The author of EMILIUS is certainly right in his opinion that these fine strokes distinguish the true character of the man, and point out the Hero from the “great vulgar,” which in his public appearance surround and obscure him. Men in high stations, engaged in the busy scenes of public life, appear in *disguise*, and may be compared to private foldiers formed into a regiment,

* Page 206. † Page 210.

where

where the coward and the hero may jostle each other without being known or distinguished, and the *uniform* which screens the infamy of the one, eclipses the glory of the other. A curious anecdote of Marshal Turenne*.

“THERE is no folly of which a man who is not a fool may not be cured except *vanity* †.”

“THE faith of children, and indeed of many grown persons, is an affair of Geography ‡.” As it is reasonable to believe God will judge men by their *works*, rather than by their *faith*, the common practice of instructing children to adopt the faith of their *country*, may not be so absurd as Mr. ROUSSEAU seems to think it. For he would not deny that religion,

* Page 214. † Page 225. ‡ Page 259.

in the most extensive sense of the word, viz. the belief of a God, and of a future state of rewards and punishments, will have the most powerful and lasting influence on the conduct of the believer. He seems to think children are less capable of receiving and retaining ideas than they really are, otherwise he would be convinced of the propriety of impressing their minds in early childhood with the idea of a God. This they cannot believe too early; though neither they, nor the wisest of men, can possibly conceive the particular mode of his existence and operation. But those who have leisure and ability to reflect, must know that God exists and acts; and those who, from various causes, are incapable of gaining this knowledge by thought and reflection, as children, and the *bulk* of the people certainly are, must either believe these great and important truths on the authority
of

of their teachers, or remain ignorant of them: they cannot be philosophers; and an attempt to divest them of superstition, would probably produce a greater evil than it might be intended to remove, by eradicating religion from their minds. If these fundamental principles of religion, the belief of a God and of a future state of rewards and punishments, are strongly impressed on the minds of the people, it will produce the most beneficial effects to themselves and the community in general, of which they are members; and if Providence has thought proper that any particular sect or mode of worship should be "an affair of geography," why should philosophers, to whom all sects are alike, desire to disturb the established religion of any nation in which they are allowed the free exercise of their own?

REMARKS

REMARKS

ON THE

THIRD VOLUME.

IT would much exceed the limits of my plan to notice every passage in these Volumes that is worthy to be remembered and attentively considered ; because there are few indeed which do not come under this description. I am therefore obliged to pass by many of them, and mean only to select a few of those which appear to me to contain the most striking sentiments, or the most controvertible positions ; leaving it to the candid judgement of the public to determine whether these *latter* are really exceptionable ;

able; or, whether the opinion I have formed respecting them is erroneous, and the reasons given in support of that opinion inconclusive. I by no means pretend to assert that this may not be the case: all I have to offer in apology is, that *truth* is the object of my inquiries; and if I have erred in the pursuit, I am open to conviction, and shall esteem myself obliged to those who shew me where I have deviated, and conduct me to the right path.

THE following passage, in the 24th page of this volume, is so peculiarly descriptive of the author's character, that I cannot resist the temptation to transcribe it: "Provided he raises himself above
 " the vulgar, and carries away the prize
 " of fame from his competitors, what
 " doth he require more? The most essential

“ tial point is to think differently from
 “ the rest of the world.”

M. ROUSSEAU justly observes, “ that
 “ unanswerable objections might be made
 “ to *all* systems, because the human un-
 “ derstanding is incapable of resolving
 “ them;” and he very pertinently asks,
 “ Ought not that system then to be pre-
 “ ferred, which explains every thing
 “ with no greater difficulty than the rest * ?”
 Very clear evidence of the real existence
 of external objects, “ from the diverse,
 “ yet concurrent, testimony of our senses,
 “ and a positive proof of our *own existence*
 “ [if we should be fools or philosophers
 “ enough to require it], from the com-
 “ parison we make of the ideas conveyed
 “ to our minds; which act must be that
 “ of an intelligent being: for the mind
 “ which compares ideas, must be distinct

* Page 26.

“ from

“ from, and superior to, the senses which
 “ convey them *.” This proof is nearly
 similar to that of DESCARTES, *Cogito ergo
 sum*; and he might have gone a step fur-
 ther, and said, *Dubito ergo sum*; for this
 would have set the absurdity of *doubting*
our own existence in the strongest light, be-
 cause the very *act of doubting* it is a proof
 of its *certainty*; since to doubt is to think,
 and to think is to exist. The author as-
 serts, that there are *sensitive beings* in
 which this power of comparing ideas is

* Page 27.

Nos ne quidem oculis cernimus ea, quæ vide-
 mus: neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore, sed viæ
 quasi quædam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad
 sede animi perforatæ. Itaq; sæpe aut cogitatione,
 aut aliqui vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris &
 oculis & auribus, neque videmus, nec audimus: ut
 facile intelligi possit, *animum* et videre, & audire,
 non eas partes quæ quasi *fenestræ* sunt animi: qui-
 bus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat &
 adsit.

Cic.

D

not

not to be discovered. He says, " I have
 " searched for it in vain, nor can I con-
 " ceive it to be in their nature. Such
 " passive beings perceive every thing
 " single and by itself; or if two objects
 " present themselves, they are perceived
 " as united into one: such beings having
 " no power to place one *in competition*
 " *with, beside, or upon*, the other, they can-
 " not *compare* them, or judge of their *sepa-*
 " *rate* existence *.

By the term *sensitive being*, M. ROUS-
 SEAU undoubtedly means, the *animal* or
brute creation in general, as distinct from
 man; but the distinction he makes be-
 tween them, that animals barely perceive
 ideas *single*, and have no power of *compar-*
ing them as man has, exists only in his
 own imagination; for an appeal to *facts*,
 which every day's experience presents us

with, will evidently demonstrate, that many animals possess in common with us, though *perhaps* in a lower degree, an internal faculty of comparing the ideas they receive by the mediation of their senses. Many instances might be adduced to prove, that they not only possess the power of comparing ideas, but of making *rational deductions* from such comparison, and of acting in *conformity* to those deductions.—
Inter hominem & belluam, hoc maxime interest, quod hæc ad id solum quod adest, quodq; præsens est accommodat; paululum admodum sentiens præteritum aut futurum. CIC.

HOWEVER unwilling the *pride* of the philosopher, or the *superstition* of the enthusiast may be to admit the *rationality* of any animal in the creation but man, yet it is demonstrably certain, that there are *many* species of animals which are ra-

tional; and it is highly probably *all* are so in some degree.

THEIR modes of perception by the mediation of the senses, are confessedly similar, and in some animals *superior* to ours; and if the existence of a principle in us *above* and distinct from mere *sensation* can be proved from the comparison *we* make of the ideas *our* senses present to us, the same evidence may be adduced of a separate principle existing in *them*.

THAT animals actually exercise this faculty of comparing ideas, will appear from the following example, which I have often observed,—A Cat wants to jump from the floor of a room upon the window; she looks up at it, and perceives it is *too high* for her to reach; but she also observes a chair or table near the window, which, on a *comparison formed in her mind*, she perceives

perceives is *not so high*. From the comparison of these distinct *ideas* of two different objects *put in competition with each other, she reasons*, and *justly* concludes, that as the table is not *so high* as the window, she must first jump upon that, and from that upon the window; which she accordingly does. Could MR. ROUSSEAU or MR. LOCKE have formed a more *rational* deduction?

INNUMERABLE instances of the rationality of animals might be produced; but in arguments of this kind, a single instance, *clearly in point*, and incontestably evident, is as conclusive as a million.

MR. ROUSSEAU'S reasons in support of his position, "that the natural state of Matter is to be at *rest*," seem by no means conclusive. They are as follow:
 "I see it [Matter] sometimes in motion,
 D 3 "and

“ and at other times at rest : hence I infer
 “ that neither motion nor rest are essential to
 “ it ; but motion being an action, is clearly
 “ the effect of a cause, of which rest is only
 “ the absence. When nothing acts upon
 “ Matter therefore, it does not move ; and
 “ for that very reason, that it is equally
 “ indifferent to motion and rest, its natu-
 “ ral state is to be at rest *.”

THE reason here assigned for the au-
 thor's conclusion, I humbly conceive leads
 to one diametrically *opposite* ; and was
 there no better argument to support the
 contrary opinion, his own above cited
 would be sufficient : for if, as he admits,
 “ Matter is equally indifferent to motion
 “ and rest ;” or, to speak more precisely,
 if there is nothing in the nature of Matter
 to incline it more to one state than to the

* Page 33.

other ;

other; these *two states* must be *equally* natural to it.

THAT they *actually are so*, will more evidently appear from the following considerations. Matter cannot in itself have any election, or even any *active* principle to incline it *more* to a state of rest than of motion; from its *vis inertiae* it must be obnoxious to any impulse, and obedient to the last it has received, till some new one operates with superior force upon it. Besides, if a state of rest was more natural to Matter than a state of motion, it would certainly require *greater* force to *overcome* this natural propensity, and communicate motion, than it would to produce *rest*, which is by no means agreeable to fact. The attraction of gravitation and the resisting medium of our atmosphere are causes which constantly act by certain degrees, and must reduce the most violent

motion of all bodies moving on or near the earth, to a state of rest in a given time.

BUT if we suppose a solid globe, or even the smallest atom of Matter, to be in motion in an *unresisting* medium, and *not* attracted by any other body, its *vis inertiae*, or *absolute passivity*, would keep it moving with an unvaried degree of velocity, till it met with some obstruction or resistance; for to suppose otherwise is to deny the *vis inertiae* of Matter (which alone renders it a subject fit to be acted upon) and to assert that Matter is endued with some principle or *active* power *destructive* to motion, and *producing* rest.

It is impossible to conceive that a dull passive mass of Matter can be possessed of any *power* inherent in itself to alter its state; and if we suppose two bodies to be
in

in the opposite states of motion and rest, it is evident they must remain so to all eternity, unless they were *acted upon*; since, *as mere Matter*, neither of them could *alter* its present state. It would be equally absurd to suppose the moving body could *cause itself* to rest, as it would be to assert that the quiescent body could *of itself begin* to move; and this Mr. ROUSSEAU must allow, otherwise he cannot maintain his own opinion above quoted, “that Matter “is equally indifferent to motion and rest:” but if he does admit this, his conclusion, “that the *natural* state of Matter is to be “at *rest*,” must be erroneous, from the above reasons, and many more that might be given.

It is no small satisfaction to me to find I am supported in what I have here ventured to maintain, in contradiction to Mr. ROUSSEAU, by an authority full as re-

spectable as his own; for Mr. WOOLASTON, though he does not reason upon the subject, expresses his opinion in the following decisive manner: "Matter will always *uniformly persist* in its present state, *either of rest or motion*, if nothing stirs, diverts, accelerates, or stops it. Nor is there any thing in all physics better settled than that which is called the *vis inertiae*, or *inertia* of Matter*."

I SHOULD here conclude the subject, if Mr. ROUSSEAU had not thought proper to add, in confirmation of the contrary opinion, and in addition to the arguments above recited from EMILIUS, a Note which merits consideration. His words are these: "Now motion cannot be essential to Matter, if Matter can be conceived to exist at rest†." This

* Religion of Nature Delineated, page 78.

† See Note page 33.

propo-

proposition is certainly *true*; but does it
 hence follow, that because motion is *not*
 essential to Matter, rest is? May not his
own battery be turned against him in this
 instance with certain success? and is not
 the *reverse* of his proposition equally true;
 "That rest cannot be essential to Matter,
 "if it can be conceived to exist in *motion*?"
 Both these assertions are undoubtedly *true*,
 and his *own* argument establishes my
 conclusion, that neither rest nor motion
 are *essential* to Matter.

MR. ROUSSEAU seems to be led into the
 erroneous opinion, "that the natural state
 "of Matter is to be at rest," through the
 fear of ascribing to Matter the *origin* of
 motion; and if of motion, consequently
 of the motion of the heavenly bodies:
 but these consequences are by no means
 admissible; for the *intelligence* manifest in
 the complicated and admirably wise di-

rection of their various motions, is alone sufficient to demonstrate that Matter with all its properties was *created*, and is governed, by a Being of infinite wisdom and power. In this point Mr. ROUSSEAU and every rational thinking man will agree, that Matter and motion are evidently *effects*, proceeding from such a Being; for suppose attraction added to them, what effects could they produce? As well might rude materials arrange themselves in order and form an edifice, without an architect, as Matter, motion, and attraction, could produce one *single orb* in the universe, or one *single plant or animal* in that orb, without a God. *Ut si quis in domum, aliquam, aut in gymnasium, aut in forum, venerit, cum videat omnium rerum rationem, modum, disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa fieri judicare, sed esse aliquam intelligat qui præsist, & cui paneatur.* CIC. I cannot conclude this subject better than in the words which

Mr.

Mr. ROUSSEAU puts into the mouth of the Savoyard Curate, as the first article of his faith: "I believe therefore, that
 "a *will* gives *motion* to the universe, and
 "animates all nature."

HE is certainly right in asserting, "that
 "it is sufficient for men to know that a
 "Being of infinite goodness, wisdom and
 "power *does* exist, without attempting to
 "inquire into the particular *mode* of his
 "existence." This inquiry must be vain
 and unsatisfactory, and it behoves us to
 beware that it is not impious.

MR. ROUSSEAU defines the word *sub-*
stance, "a being possessed of some primi-
 "tive quality, abstracted from all par-
 "ticular or secondary qualities*." I do
 not pretend to say Mr. ROUSSEAU could

* Page 54.

not have a clear conception of such an existence as he here describes ; but to me the idea of a being thus divested of “ all “ secondary or particular qualities,” seems more chimerical than that of an Hydra or a Griffin. It may be owing to dulness of apprehension, or weakness of understanding, that I am unable to conceive the idea of any such existence as *substance*, in the abstract sense in which Metaphysicians use the term : even Mr. LOCKE, the clearest of all reasoners, does not make this idea of substance intelligible to me ; nor can I possibly suppose, that if every property or quality by which a particular existence is distinguished from all others, should be substracted, there would be *any thing* left.

LET us take Mr. LOCKE's example of *Gold*, and suppose it to possess malleability, solidity, solubility, and as many other properties, known and unknown,

as it actually does contain. If any one should ask me, "What is the *substance* of gold?" or wherein does it differ from all other "substances?" I should answer without hesitation, "Merely in the *peculiar assemblage* of the different properties appertaining to it;" and the plain uninformed dictates of common sense would suggest to me, that if *all* these properties could be substracted from Gold, the ideas of substance and existence would evaporate in the analysis: Yet this conclusion, rational as it appears to me, would be ridiculed by all profound metaphysicians; and even ROUSSEAU would condescend to agree with the great MR. LOCKE, in laughing at my ignorance. They would tell me, there is in reality such a substance or *substratum* as Gold, a separate existence distinct from all its properties, and *that* wherein they all reside. In vain do I attempt to conceive an idea of this mysterious existence

without

without properties: *faith* must on this occasion assume the province of baffled reason, and I must receive this doctrine as men do a divine mystery, which, though it exceeds their comprehension, may obtain their belief on account of the *origin* from whence it is derived.—Mr. ROUSSEAU more than insinuates, that Mr. LOCKE (whom he is always too apt to censure) has asserted, “that Matter thinks;” or, in other words, “that the soul is material:” nor is he the only one that has hinted, by way of reproach, that such was the opinion of that great man. But it does not appear from his works, that he ever maintained this doctrine. He does indeed say, in his “Essay on Human Understanding,” in that unassuming and just style of reasoning for which he is so eminently distinguished, and which renders him the clearest yet the least dogmatical of all philosophers, “It is by no means

“ means clear to me, that God *cannot* annex
 “ thought to matter,” or nearly to that
 effect. But surely, this is not *asserting*
 the materiality of the soul.

THOSE who confidently maintain that
 the Deity has *not the power* of creating a
 material thinking being, that the soul
must necessarily be immaterial, and there-
 fore *must* be immortal, would do well to
 consider they are absurdly and impiously
 prescribing *limitations* to the *omnipotent*
 Creator, and arrogantly deciding a ques-
 tion which is far beyond the reach of
 human reason; for on either side we
 have objections to militate which are in-
 superable to our limited powers.

It is surely uncandid and illiberal in
 those who maintain the immateriality of
 the soul, to cast oblique and invidious
 reflections on such as dare to question the
 argu-

arguments they adduce in support of their opinion; or to represent even their *avowed* *opponents* as enemies to the cause of religion and virtue, and as little short of downright atheists. For it is to be observed, there are *many* who deny that the immateriality of the soul admits of *positive* proofs, and yet may think that opinion on the whole liable to less strong objections, and much *more consonant to reason*, than the contrary: and of those who absolutely maintain the *materiality* of the soul, all who are capable of such a degree of thought and reflection as the importance of the subject requires, must acknowledge, that the soul, whatever it is, derives its existence from God, and is dependant on him.

NEITHER does the immortality of the soul seem, by any means, a *necessary* consequence of its immateriality, any more than

than its materiality implies an *absolute certainty* of its dissolution with the death of the *body*. For if it be said, that which is immaterial is indivisible, and incorruptible, therefore being *incapable* of dissolution it must of *necessity* be immortal; it may justly be replied, that a man who should attempt to fathom the ocean with a short and slender thread, and who should affirm that it *must* be bottomless, because he had found no bottom, would not be guilty of a greater absurdity than those philosophers are, who impiously suppose the *infinite* power of God to be *limited* by the narrow bounds of human reason. Does it follow that God *cannot destroy* the work of his own creation, because man cannot conceive *how* its destruction can be effected?

It is equally unphilosophical to maintain, that if the soul is material, it must *necessarily*

necessarily perish with the dissolution of the body. What imposes this necessity, and on whom is it imposed? If these confident reasoners should be asked, "Why a Being of infinite power could not continue the existence of the soul, *if material*, for millions of ages?"—they would probably reply, "From our *intimate* knowledge of the nature and properties of Matter, we are certain it is impossible." But how small a degree of knowledge have the most sagacious inquirers attained of the nature and properties of Matter! and how contemptibly arrogant must they be, who imagine the infinite power of God cannot exceed their comprehension in *this* instance; as it manifestly has even in the *origin* of our own existence, and in the *creation* of that small part of the universe on which we live! Can the wisest of human beings *conceive* the *possibility* of God's creating something out of nothing?

Yet

Yet incomprehensible, and even contradictory to human reason as this appears, we *must* believe it, or admit the most glaring absurdities:—if we deny it, we must suppose that dull, inanimate, corruptible Matter existed from all eternity independent of the Deity; which leads to the grossest folly, impiety, and atheism!

“ In pride, in reasoning pride our error lies,
“ Men *quit their sphere* to rush into the skies.”

IF philosophers would, in their metaphysical speculations, always remember the *very narrow* limits of human understanding, and seriously endeavour to investigate *truth*, rather than to vanquish their antagonists, inquiries of this nature might be beneficial to mankind; but as they are too frequently conducted, they seem calculated only to diffuse error, and nourish human pride,—the worst and the weakest of vices.

IF

IF a disputant proceeding on these principles can urge an objection which his opponent cannot answer, he is elated with his imaginary triumph; though perhaps he is liable to be baffled in his turn, by a question equally unanswerable. Both may thus be confuted, though neither are convinced; but each will adhere to his former opinion, since he can support it with *unanswerable* arguments. However a calm dispassionate spectator might admire the *skill* of this logical duel, he would esteem the combatants nearly on a level with the antient gladiators, or modern prize-fighters, whose occupation would excite contempt, though their dexterity might extract applause.

M. ROUSSEAU, in discussing the important question at present under consideration, seems more anxious to confute his
antago-

antagonists, than to adduce proofs or arguments in support of his own opinion.

HE *asserts*, indeed, “ that the soul *must* “ be immaterial; that it is *demonstrably* “ so; that it *cannot possibly* be otherwise:” but would he not have rendered his cause more service by *proving* these assertions, if they admit of positive proof, which would have *decided* the controversy at once? And if they do not, would not all men of candour and moderation rather say with Mr. LOCKE, “ We *believe* the “ soul to be immaterial, as this opinion “ seems *much more* rational than the con- “ trary; but as the subject is *beyond* the “ reach of human understanding, and does “ not admit of *absolute* demonstration, we “ dare not say it *must* certainly be so, lest “ we should be mistaken.”

BUT our author, conceiving the immateriality of the soul to be among those
self-

self-evident propositions which require no proof, contents himself with proposing the following difficulties to be solved by his opponents.—“ If *any* particle
“ of Matter can have the property of think-
“ ing, *every* particle of Matter must equally
“ possess it. If the soul is material, it must
“ therefore be infinitely divisible, and there
“ must be as many *souls* as there are *atoms*
“ in our bodies ;” and more objections of
a similar nature, which have all been frequently urged on the like occasion, and really appear to be *unanswerable*. Yet might not an advocate for the *materiality* of the soul imagine he had done equal service to his cause, by proposing questions no less difficult and perplexing? Might he not say, “ If souls are immaterial,
“ how can they be comprehended in, and
“ confined to, particular bodies by *material*
“ limits? How can they actuate, direct,
“ and restrain the motions of the bodies
“ they

" they inhabit? Why do they *dread* the
 " destruction of their prisons? How
 " are they made *insensible* or *drunk* with
 " wine, or *mad* with the *bite* of an animal?
 " How is the madness of the *immaterial*
 " soul conveyed from parents to children,
 " like any hereditary disease of the body?
 " How is this immaterial malady often
 " cured by medicine? Why do chil-
 " dren frequently resemble their parents
 " as much in mental, as corporeal quali-
 " ties? How can the *immaterial* principle
 " be affected by the *growth* and decline of
 " the body? Why does it generally
 " expand in infancy, blossom in child-
 " hood, ripen in manhood, and decay
 " in age?"

THESE and many more difficulties
 might be urged by a Materialist, by way
 of reply to Mr. ROUSSEAU's objections;
 and while they were thus alternately con-

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futing,

futing, and *confuted* by each other, the great question would remain in its original obscurity.

ON the whole, as thought and volition seem to be, in their nature, so greatly *superior* to, and so entirely *different* from, any of the properties of Matter that *we* are acquainted with; it seems *more* than barely probable, though perhaps not absolutely certain, that the soul, or principle of thought and volition, is *immaterial*, i. e. it is *not mere Matter*: for it is necessary to make this *remarkable* distinction in *favour* of the *Immaterialist*, that he only declares what the soul is *not*; while the *Materialist* pretends that he knows what it *is*; which knowledge certainly lies beyond the reach of human understanding. The *former* therefore, though *less* confident, bids fair to be nearer the truth than the latter.

THE

THE late Mr. BAXTER, in the latter part of his ingenious Treatise on the Soul, has deduced *strong* if not absolutely decisive arguments in favour of its immateriality, from the phenomenon of *dreaming*. It seems extraordinary that so universal, and at the same time so surprising and unaccountable an appearance in human nature, should have been so little noticed by the most eminent writers on metaphysical subjects; but if I am not greatly mistaken, Mr. BAXTER is the only one who has esteemed it of sufficient importance to be fully and minutely considered. It is evident the great Mr. LOCKE, in his incomparable Essay on Human Understanding, did not account it worthy his particular attention; otherwise that clear and accurate reasoner would not have asserted that the human soul can *only* perceive ideas by *sensation* or *reflection*; because it is evident, that in dreaming it

actually *does* perceive them in a manner totally different from *either*.—That the soul is *active* while the body is at *rest*, and that it cannot *receive* ideas by sensation, while the organs of sensation are in a state of *inability* to convey them, are self-evident propositions. That it does *not* perceive them by *reflection*, is equally certain, because the soul cannot reflect without being *conscious* that it does so; nor can it *suppose* those ideas which it derives from reflection to be received through the medium of the *corporeal* organs. In dreaming, the soul seems to exist in a manner totally distinct, and even separate from the body.—The former retains its *consciousness*, its *activity*, and all its *rational* faculties; while the latter remains in a state nearly resembling death. From these premises (if my memory does not deceive me) Mr. BAXTER deduces the most strong and convincing arguments to prove

prove the immateriality of the soul, and its *capability* of *surviving* the destruction of the body. As it is by no means consistent with my plan to pursue this enquiry to any considerable length, I refer the philosophical reader to Mr. BAXTER'S Treatise, where, if he does not meet with *conviction*, he will be certain of finding entertainment. I cannot, however, dismiss the subject without observing, that the system of Materialism, *revived* by Dr. PRIESTLEY, and other ingenious men of this age, cannot be defended without proving Mr. BAXTER'S arguments from the phenomenon of *dreaming* to be *fallacious*. For even if it should be admitted, that all the ideas which the soul perceives either by *sensation* or *reflection*, are presented to it in consequence of the proper disposition of the various parts of the animal, *e. g.* of the organs of sensation to convey, — of the memory to retain, — of the brain

to receive, discern, discriminate, arrange, compare, &c. (for all which concessions a Materialist ought to esteem himself under some small *obligation* to his opponent) he would still be totally unable to give any plausible account of the phænomenon of dreaming on material, which are merely *mechanical*, principles.—Yet this he must do, or acknowledge his system to be *indesensible*; for, as I before observed, those who maintain the *materiality* of the soul maintain an *affirmative*, which if true not only *admits* of, but requires *positive proof*; they are therefore indispensably obliged to account for *every* operation and faculty of the soul on *material* principles.—But the Immaterialist may consistently with reason say, that though he knows the soul is *not* material, he does not pretend to be intimately acquainted with the nature and properties of *spiritual* beings; and though he is very certain what it is

not,

not, he does not presume to determine what it *is*. He may know, for instance, that the phænomenon of dreaming *cannot* be accounted for on *material* principles; yet surely no one will contend, that he therefore is bound to account for it?

BUT if thought and volition are incompatible with, and incommunicable to, Matter; it *necessarily* follows, that *all animals* who have these faculties, are actuated by an *immaterial* principle; since if it could be proved that Matter and mechanism could produce even the least degree of thought and volition in any animal, we should be assured they *might* produce the same effect in us. Again: If *immortality* be (as many Metaphysicians assert) the *necessary* consequence of immateriality, and if thought and volition are incompatible with *Matter*, it must be admitted, that *all animals* who have thought and

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volition

volition must necessarily have *immortal* souls, from the highest to the lowest.

It is to get rid of this *unavoidable dilemma*, so humiliating to the pride of human nature, that mankind in general, even those of the most eminent abilities, *deny* our *fellow-animals* to be capable of thought or volition, though we have the *most clear* and demonstrable evidence of *facts* to prove that they certainly *do* possess these faculties.

BUT is it not more rational to conclude, that *immortality* is by no means the *necessary* consequence of *immateriality*; and that our duration in a *future* state, as well as in this, depends *entirely* on the *will* of the Deity, whose power no *limits* can controul? The amazing *inequality* manifest in the dispensations of Providence towards his creatures in this world, is the *strongest* proof

proof of a future state, of a "kingdom of
 "reason to come:" and to doubt it, is
worse than atheism—it is *blasphemy*, because
 such a doubt implies that God *may* be
unjust, malevolent, cruel!!

MR. WOOLASTON expresses the same
 opinion in the following words: "If
 "what is objected [*i. e.* respecting the
 "unequal dispensations of Providence in
 "this life] be in many instances true, this
 "only infers the *necessity* of a future state:
 "that is, if good and bad men are not re-
 "spectively treated according to *reason* in
 "this life, they may yet be so treated, if
 "*this and another to follow* be taken together
 "into the account. And perhaps it is (as
 "I have been always apt to think) in
 "order to *convince* us of the certainty of
 "a future state, that instances of that
 "kind have been so *numerous*. For he
 "must not only be guilty of *blasphemy*,

“but reduced to the greatest absurdity,
 “who rather than he will own there *is*
 “such a state, is forced to make God an
 “*unreasonable* being; which I think
 “amounts to a strong demonstration that
 “there is one*.”

THE same respectable author, in
 another part of his excellent treatise above
 quoted, says: “If there was in the world
 “but a *single* instance of *inequality* in the
 “dispensations of Providence, it would
 “convince him of the certainty of a future
 “state*.”

THE question concerning liberty and
 necessity, is the next that comes under
 our author's consideration, in the Savoy-
 ard Curate's Profession of Faith, and is
 another of those metaphysical *enigmas*:

* Religion of Nature Delineated, Page 114.

which

which the mind of Man will never be able to solve. There can be no doubt but Man is a *free agent*, i. e. he is free to *put in act* the dictates of his *will*, if no accidental impediment restrains him: Thus, if he determines to move to the right or to the left, he is free to move in either direction; and his corporeal organs will immediately obey the *impulse* of his *will*, if not prevented by any internal defect, or external obstruction; though, even clear and incontestible as this *fact* is, we are totally unable to assign the *cause*, or explain the *manner* in which the soul acts upon the body to produce this effect. *Corpora nostra non novimus, quæ sint situs partium quam vim quæque pars habet ignoramus. Cic.*

I resolve to get up, or to sit down, and I execute that resolution: but what *connexion* is there between the *act* of my mind and that of my body? Or, why does the latter immediately follow, in consequence of,

and in obedience to, the former? Our *finite* capacities cannot explain this difficulty, which is but the *passage* to that *inextricable labyrinth* in which the question of liberty and necessity is involved.

If the power of *acting* in obedience to the dictates of our will, be all that is meant by *free-agency*, this power undoubtedly belongs to Man. But the great point of enquiry is, "Whether his *will* "is free?" Mr. ROUSSEAU delivers his opinion on this intricate subject in the following words: "When I am asked, "what is the cause which determines my "will? I ask in my turn, what is the cause "that determines my judgement? for it "is clear that these two causes make but "one: and if we conceive that Man is active in forming his judgement of things, "that his understanding is only a power "of judging and comparing, we shall see "that

" that his liberty is only a similar power,
 " or one derived from this. He chooses
 " the *good*, as he judges of the *true*; and
 " for the same reason as he deduces a
 " false judgement, he makes a bad choice.
 " What then is the cause that determines
 " his *will*? It is his judgement. And
 " what is the cause that determines his
 " judgement? It is his intelligent faculty,
 " his *power of judging*; the determining
 " cause lies within himself. If we go
 " beyond this point, I know nothing of
 " the matter *."

Thus far Mr. Rousseau ventures to
 go; and this he considers as the *ne plus*
ultra of the argument. If so, we are in-
 deed stopped at the very threshold; for
 surely we can gain but very little infor-
 mation from this *transient* view of the ques-

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tion, which, so far from *explaining* the great difficulty, never *advert*s to it.

ALL we here discover is, "that the judgement determines the will, and the *"power of judging"* determines the *judgement*." This philosophy very strongly resembles that of the Indian Priests, who maintain that the world is supported by an Elephant, and the Elephant by a Tortoise.

If the will is determined by the intellectual faculty, or *power of judging*, on a comparison of the motives which induce us to do or restrain us from doing any particular act; and we should, after exercising this power of judging, pursue that conduct which to our judgement should appear the most eligible; still our *freedom of will* would not be ascertained; for the question will recur, as indeed Mr. Rous-

SEAU.

SEAU states it, "What is the cause which determines a Man's judgement?" for whatever determines *that*, determines his *will*. If it be answered, his judgement is determined by motives of advantage to himself; I reply, that cannot be: for if the cause of determination proceeds from motives of *real* advantage, *all* men in *similar* circumstances would pursue the *same* conduct; and their will, determined *solely* by an *invariable* cause, could not be *free*. But it is evident that the judgement is determined not by *real*, but by *apparent* motives of advantage; and this difference of appearance, as Mr. ROUSSEAU justly observes, depends in a great measure on Men's different "powers of judging," or comparing ideas.—But suppose it were granted, that the will *was* in *all* cases determined by the power of judging (which however is not admissible) we cannot from thence conclude, with Mr. ROUS-

SEAU,

THE REMARKS ON

SEAU, "that the determining cause lies
 " *within ourselves*, and that, consequently,
 " our will is free," unless we could believe
 that our *different powers of judging depended*
 on or were *caused by ourselves*; which they
 certainly are *not*, any more than our par-
 ticular complexion, features, or stature.

PERHAPS an example may better ex-
 plain my meaning. Let us suppose two
 men (Thomas and John) to be in cir-
 cumstances *exactly similar*. What causes
 the *apparent* advantage of one particular
 mode of conduct to determine the will of
 Thomas, while to the judgement of John,
 the advantage appears to lie on the *opposite*
 side?—Mr. ROUSSEAU would say, their
different powers of judging determines their
 choice. And whence arises this *disparity*
 in their powers of judging?—It is caused,
 he would reply, by their different degrees
 of intellectual ability.—Is this difference

of understanding, by which it is said their will is *ultimately* influenced, caused by or dependent on themselves?—Certainly *not*; and therefore the determining cause does not (even on Mr. ROUSSEAU's supposition) lie *within* Thomas or John, in the instance above stated.

THE account given by our author of the freedom of the human *will*, is briefly as follows: The *will* is determined by the judgement,—the judgement by the power of judging,—the power of judging by the degree of understanding,—and *this* by some cause *absolutely independent* on the Man whose *will* it influences and directs. Thus, by Mr. ROUSSEAU's account of the matter, it appears, that the *ultimate* determining power of Man's will is totally *extraneous*; and that, consequently, the act of volition cannot, as he
main-

maintains, "lie within," or even originate with or depend upon ourselves.

HENCE it clearly appears, that our author's *conclusion* is not just, supposing his premises were granted, that the will is influenced by the judgement, weighing the different motives of action, and fixing its determination by those which are apparently the most advantageous to the agent. But these premises are in *many*, if not in *most* cases totally inadmissible. The influence of the passions, of prejudice, of education, custom, climate, constitution, and numerous other causes, operate with amazing force on the human *will*; and can that be called *free*, which is continually subject to such arbitrary, such capricious controul? How often are even the best and wisest of Men led by one or more of these fluctuating causes to act in direct *opposition* to their judgements?

How

How frequently is our reason itself perverted, and our judgement deceived by them?

THERE is, besides, another latent but powerful agent, absolutely *independent* of judgement, passions, or any of the causes before adverted to, which often determines the will of Man in the most important events of his life; and if he happens to be intrusted with the direction of a nation's councils, the existence of *thousands* of his fellow-creatures may depend on the decision.—The cause I mean is the *sudden involuntary production of thought* in the mind of Man, which frequently determines the will, uninfluenced by any external motive, or rational deduction whatever. The vulgar but significant expression, “it came into my head that I “would do this or that particular thing,” may employ whole hours of reflection.

THOUGHTS

THOUGHTS come as it were *spontaneously* into our minds. From what secret silent source do they flow? Human reason is totally unable to solve this important question. They may, as Mr. WOOLASTON observes, “be caused by the suggestion, “or impulse, or other silent communications of some *spiritual being*; perhaps “by the Deity himself. For that such “imperceptible *influences* and *still* whispers *may* be, none of us all can positively deny: that is, we cannot know “certainly that there are no such things. “On the contrary, I believe there are but “very few of those who have made observations upon themselves, and their “affairs, but must, when they reflect on “life past, and the various adventures “and events in it, find many instances in “which their usual *judgement* and sense of “things cannot but seem to themselves to “have been *over-ruled* they know not “by

"by *what*, nor *how*, nor *why*; (i.e. they
 "have done things which afterwards they
 "wonder how they came to do) and that
 "these actions have had consequences
 "very *remarkable* in their history.

"I SPEAK not here of Men dementated
 "with wine, or enchanted with some
 "temptation: the thing holds true even
 "of Men in their sober and more con-
 "sidering seasons."

"THAT there may be *possibly* such in-
 "spiration of *new* thoughts and counsels,
 "may perhaps further appear from this :
 "that we do frequently find thoughts
 "*arising in our heads*, into which we are
 "led by *no* discourse, nothing we *read*,
 "*no* clue of *reasoning*, but they surprise
 "and come upon us from we know not
 "*what quarter* *."

* Religion of Nature Delineated, Page 107.

EVEN

EVEN those who maintain, with Mr. ROUSSEAU, that the will of Man is absolutely *free*, may perhaps a moment after they have made the assertion, falsify it themselves, by forming a resolution produced by a sudden internal *impulse*, for whose origin they can no more assign a cause, than they can for the power of Attraction!

BESIDES the *physical* difficulties attending the discussion of the important but inexplicable question concerning the freedom of the human *will*, others of a *moral* nature, no less perplexing, demand our most serious attention.

THE infinite *knowledge* of God, and his *over-ruling* Providence in the disposal of every event, are truths which reason and religion forbid us to doubt. Yet how hard a task should we impose on the *limited* faculties

faculties of the human understanding, were we to require it to demonstrate that the knowledge of God is infinite—that his government over the universe is unlimited—that the *will* of Man is notwithstanding *free*, and uninfluenced—and that his power of judging *solely* determines all his actions!

ALL who have attempted to discuss this intricate subject, have been aware of this difficulty, which obtrudes itself to their notice, and cannot be overlooked even by the most superficial observer, nor fathomed by the most profound. It cannot be expected that in an Essay like the present, *desultory* in its *plan*, and circumscribed by the *avocations*, by the *intention*, and most of all by the *abilities* of the writer, the various attempts of the most able Metaphysicians to reconcile the *Prescience* and *Providence* of God with the *free-*
will

will of Man, should be minutely examined; and to present their *principal arguments* in an *abridged* or *mutilated* state, would be doing them manifest injustice, and could afford neither information nor entertainment to the reader, since these arguments form part of a connected *chain* of reasoning, which requires to be examined *unbroken*.

TO THOSE who wish to know the *utmost extent* of human reason, would do well to consult the writings of Mr. LOCKE and Mr. WOOLASTON, who have exerted the extraordinary force of their very superior abilities in discussing the difficult and important subjects which compose the principal part of the celebrated "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Curate," and which are therefore unavoidably *glanced at* in these Remarks.

ON

ON points of so important and intricate a nature, it behoves all men to speak, and even to *think*, with the greatest degree of circumspection and reverence; and on the whole to conclude they *misapply*, if not *abuse*, the faculties entrusted to them by Providence, when they attempt to *unveil* those mysteries which God has concealed in impenetrable obscurity.

MR. LOCKE has left this inexplicable question, "How far the human will is "free," exactly in that state where Reason and Religion direct it should be left. His penetrating eye *saw*, but could not pierce the veil.—He knew the utmost bounds of human understanding, which he never endeavoured to exceed; and on those subjects where he candidly confesses his *ignorance*, he gives the most indubitable proofs of his knowledge and profound penetration.

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He concludes, in the present instance, that it is absolutely *impossible* for human reason to ascertain how far the *will* is, or is not *free*. But to what does this just conclusion lead? Not to scepticism and impiety, but to that which Reason and Religion concur to approve.

IF I do not greatly mistake, he dismisses the question in terms to the following import: "Though we cannot obtain the knowledge how far the human *will is free*, nor consequently in what degree Man may be considered as a *free-agent*, in a *moral* sense; yet thus much we may *certainly* know, that in all those actions wherein he *is free*, he must be accountable to God for his conduct."

MR. WOOLASTON expresses himself nearly in the same manner, where he takes occasion to notice the effects produced in the human

human mind and conduct by the spontaneous production of thoughts. "If
 " any one (says he) should object, that if
 " men are thus *over-ruled* in their actings,
 " then they are deprived of their liberty,
 " &c. the answer is, That though Man is
 " a free-agent, he may not be free as to
 " *every thing*. His freedom may be *re-*
 " *strained*, and he *only accountable* for those
 " acts in respect of which he is *free* *."

FROM this conclusion, in which Mr. LOCKE and Mr. WOOLASTON *exactly agree*, we may form a rule for our conduct, which if we strictly observe, we cannot greatly err. It is highly probable, the human will may be free in *many* instances; but if it was barely *possible* it might be so in a *few*, we ought, so far as we are able, to act on the presumption that

* Religion of Nature Delineated, page 107.

it is really so in all. For since we certainly are *accountable* for those actions which are the effects of our *free* election, we ought on all occasions to endeavour so to act that we may be prepared to render an account of our whole conduct, and always to remember that such an account *may be* required.



THE origin of Evil is the next subject of Mr. ROUSSEAU's consideration: and this is certainly as inscrutable a mystery as the question of Liberty and Necessity. Though it is not necessary to repeat, it is hoped the candid reader will remember, the reasons assigned in the consideration of the preceding article for not *retailing* what others have written on these subjects, or entering further into them than I am *led* by my author.

IN

IN discussing this point, he adheres to the position with which I concluded the former question, which was, that "Man can only be guilty of *moral evil*, in those instances wherein his will is *free*;" though, with great submission, I conceive he has misapplied it, and deduced from it a consequence by no means admissible, because his premises are erroneous. "If Man (says he) be an *active and free* being, he acts of himself; none of his *spontaneous* actions therefore enter into the general system of Providence, nor can be imputed to it*." Thus, by taking it *for granted* that the *freedom* of the human will is *unlimited*, and by applying to these false premises the axiom, "that Man is guilty of moral evil in those instances wherein he is free," Mr. ROUSSEAU concludes, that Man is *therefore* the *sole* author of *all* the moral evil that is in the world.

* Page 60.

BUT as it is evident that Man is *not* a being of unlimited *free-will*, the arguments deduced from the supposition that he *is* so, are inconclusive. Besides, is not this attempt to prove Man the author of all moral evil *derogatory* to the omnipotence of the Deity? Nay, is it not absolutely to divest him of the *moral government* of the world, and to reduce him to that supine inactive state in which the Epicureans represented him? What can be more *impious* than to suppose God created a world for his creatures to govern? Yet how can we avoid adopting this absurd opinion, if we agree with our author, “that Man is an *unlimited free-agent*, “and that none of his *spontaneous* actions “(i. e. none of his *rational* actions) enter “into the general system of Providence, “nor can be imputed to it.” Besides, if this is admitted as a proof that all the moral *evil* in the world is derived from
Man,

Man, it will also prove that all the moral *good* is derived from him *too*: for if his actions are the *sole* cause of the former, they must also be the sole cause of the latter. I only mention these *inevitable* consequences of such reasoning, to shew its fallacy. For if it was admitted, we must absolutely deny the Providence of God, so far as it relates to the moral government of the world; and it would be *irrational* to implore his protection from the violence of wicked men, since his interference would be inconsistent with and destructive of their *free-agency*.

THESE are tenets too impious for a good Man, and too absurd for a rational Man to believe, when he perceives the inevitable consequences to which they lead.—We shall see immediately what wretched expedients Mr. ROUSSEAU is obliged to employ in support of his

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system.

system.—He is aware of the difficulty, and strives, though in vain, to get rid of it.
“ Providence does not (he says) *contrive*
“ the evil which is the consequence of
“ Man’s abusing the liberty his Creator
“ gave him; it only doth *not prevent* it;
“ either because the evil which so *impo-*
“ *tent* a creature as Man is capable of
“ doing, is *beneath its notice*; or because
“ it *cannot* prevent it without laying a
“ *restraint* upon his liberty, and causing
“ a greater evil by *debasing* his nature.
“ Providence hath left Man at liberty,
“ not that he should do evil, but good
“ by choice. It hath capacitated him to
“ make such choice, in making a proper
“ use of the faculties it hath bestowed
“ upon him: his powers, however, are at
“ the same time *so limited and confined*,
“ that the abuse he makes of his liberty
“ is not of importance enough to disturb
“ the *general order* of the universe*.”

* Page 60.

THE mode of reasoning pursued in the above quotation, is totally repugnant to our ideas of the infinite Prescience, Justice, Power, and Wisdom of the Deity.

I. It is inconsistent with the Prescience of God, because it asserts that the evil Man does, is *caused* by his abusing the liberty his Creator *gave* him.—But if the abuse of his liberty is the *consequence* of his being entrusted with it, it cannot be consistent with the *Prescience* of the Deity to suppose him *ignorant* of this consequence, when he *created* the evil free-agent.

II. It is a negation of the infinite *Justice* of God to suppose he does not prevent his creatures from doing evil, “because the evil which so *impotent* a being as Man is capable of doing, is *beneath his notice*.” Now it is impossible

that any *one* act of violence, cruelty, or injustice, committed by the most *impotent* of the human race, can be *beneath the notice* of a God of infinite *Justice* and Majesty, to whom the *greatest* and the least actions of Men appear equally *impotent* :

“ He sees with *equal eye*, as *God of all*,

“ A Hero perish, or a Sparrow fall.”

The ideas of *great* and *little* are merely *comparative*; and as they owe their existence to our *finite* capacities, and in themselves imply *limitation*, they are totally incompatible with the infinite Majesty of God, to whom no *finite* Being, whether great or little in *our* estimation, can bear the most distant comparison :

“ To Him, no high, no low, no great, no small,

“ He fills, he bounds, connects, and *equals all*.”

Human actions are *all* infinitely *beneath the notice* of the Deity, any further than as they
are

are in *themselves* right or wrong, or respecting our fellow-creatures *just* or *unjust*. It must be acknowledged, we are too apt to form a *precipitate* and unfavourable judgement of the conduct of others;—to call some actions *good*, and others *evil*, without knowing the *motives* of the agent—in what degree he is *free* to *act* conformable to his intentions—how far the consequences of his conduct were foreseen by him—or whether those consequences, though productive of afflictions and calamities to *us* for the *present*, many not lead to *future* good in this, or in *another* state. God alone, to whom all these circumstances are known, is able to *judge* his creatures, and to determine how far their actions are absolutely *good* or *evil*, and in what degree the *agents* are *free* or *controuled*, criminal or innocent.

III. It is inconsistent with the *infinite Power* of the Deity to assert, “that

F. 6

“he

“ he *cannot* prevent Man from doing evil,
“ without laying a *restraint* upon his
“ *liberty*, and causing a greater evil by
“ debasing his nature.”—How the nature
of Man should be *debased*, or a greater *evil*
should be produced, by *preventing* him
from committing a *bad* action, than by
permitting him to do it, I own totally
surpasses my comprehension; but allow-
ing, for argument’s sake, that it *may* be
so, what does this supposition of our
author’s amount to, but that God was
necessitated to produce *evil*, though of *two*
evils he chose the *least*!—If such a *ne-*
cessity could *be*, the power of God could
not be infinite, but, *dreadful* even to *men-*
tion! must be subject to an *evil Principle*,
imposing that necessity!

IV. As it is an impious and ab-
surd negation of the *Omnipotence* of the
Deity to suppose he *could* be *constrained*
or

or *limited* by any such *necessity*, it is equally *inconsistent* with his infinite *Wisdom* to believe he would *produce into existence*, a *free-agent* who should have power to *counteract* His designs by the *evils* arising from the *abuse* of the *liberty* with which God entrusted him.

IN order to avoid this last consequence, Mr. ROUSSEAU is reduced to the necessity of asserting, "that the powers of Man are "so *limited*, that the *abuse* he makes of "his liberty is not of sufficient consequence to disturb the *general* order of "the *Universe*." He here, with remarkable *dexterity*, shifts the question from the *moral order* of our *World* (to which the *moral* actions of Man can *only* relate) to the *general* order of the *Universe*, with which they have not the most distant connection. It is exceedingly evident, that the *general* order of the *Universe* was
not

not *disturbed*, or the *revolutions* of the Planets *interrupted*, by the ravages and massacres occasioned by the use ALEXANDER the Great made of his free-agency; even our own Globe, the stage of his Tragedies, *no doubt* performed its annual and diurnal rotations with the same *order* and regularity *then*, as at any other time: but the *moral order* of the *World* must have been in a state of admirable *serenity* indeed, not to be a *little disturbed* by the *moral evils* he was diffusing over an extensive part of it.

FROM the consideration of *Moral*, Mr. ROUSSEAU proceeds to that of *Physical Evil*.—"Moral Evil (he informs us) is
 "incontestably our own work, and Physi-
 "cal Evil would in fact be *nothing*, did
 "not our own vices render us sensible of
 "it *."

* Page 61.

THIS

THIS opinion does not appear to be consonant to reason; neither is it agreeable to fact. *Moral Evil* may in some instances affect Men in a degree nearly proportionate to their vices; but *Physical Evil* falls like the rain from heaven, "upon the just and the unjust." Plague, pestilence, famine, tempests, hurricanes, inundations, volcanoes, earthquakes, are *all physical evils* of a general and extensive nature, operating totally independent on the virtues or vices of Man; and affecting *indiscriminately* all creatures who are exposed to their destructive fury. The devastations of war, more dreadful to the human race than any of the causes already enumerated, are not here included in the catalogue of physical evils; because it may be said, war is a *moral evil* occasioned by the *vices* of Mankind; though it is worthy of observation, that an ALEXANDER or a CÆSAR, whose ambition has deluged whole

whole nations with blood, are exempt *themselves* from the miseries attendant on their wickedness, and even build their *Happiness and Glory* upon the number and extent of their destructive conquests; while the punishment that seems due to the *moral evils* they have caused, is inflicted on the innocent and defenceless victims of their Tyranny and Injustice.—*Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi.*

SUCH is the administration of human affairs in this imperfect state, “that there is *one* event to the righteous and “to the wicked;” or if there is a difference, it is clearly in *favour* of the latter. Why then should philosophers *deny*, what the earliest records of History and every Man’s experience concur to prove? It is evident there is much *moral* evil in the World arising from the actions of Men. God, who created them,
and

and who knows the limits he has assigned, and the *liberty* he has allowed them, is *alone* able to judge how far they are *guilty* of the moral evils resulting from their conduct. Human laws must be framed, and human punishments annexed to the breach of them, on the supposition that Man is an *unlimited* free-agent; and each Man, whether in his public or private character, *must* regulate his conduct by the *same* rule: but it by no means follows that this *rule* is the standard of *truth*. In *civil* society, he who *voluntarily* takes away the life of *one* fellow-creature, unless in *defence* of his own, is punished with *death*; while the Hero, who murders *thousands*, is graced with triumphs and loaded with honours. Thus the Prince or Minister who sits at *ease*, and projects a war in which millions of lives may be sacrificed, is celebrated for the glorious success of his arms, and receives in one collected wreath the

Laurels

Laurels acquired by his Generals and Armies in their extensive diffusion of misery and desolation !

“ One to destroy is murder by the law,

“ And Justice keeps th’ uplifted hand in awe ;

“ To murder thousands takes a specious name,

“ War’s glorious art, and gains immortal fame.”

YOUNG’S Love of Fame.

But if Man is *unlimited* in the freedom of his *will*, if all moral evil is caused by his *abuse* of this freedom, and if the lives of *Millions* may thus be subject to the absolute disposal of *one*, who is by *nature* their equal, and by *accident* their tyrant, how strangely *unequal* is the lot of Man ! how erroneous his judgment of human actions ! and how *enormous* must be the guilt of an heroic Monarch, in comparison to that of a public robber or private assassin !

THAT moral evil is produced by the
actions.

actions of Men is evident ; but it is surely more rational to suppose him, in many cases, the *instrument*, than the *agent* ; and rather to believe the fate of empires is decided by *Providence*, than that it is left to the capricious disposal of a weak or cruel Tyrant.

It is incontestably certain, that there is much *physical* evil in the world, totally independent of human power to produce or prevent ; but it is equally true that the balance greatly preponderates in favour of Order, Harmony, and Utility, in the material Creation.

It cannot be denied, that there are many *moral* evils incident to Man in a social state ; and perhaps in a *great measure* resulting from it : but on the other hand it must be allowed, that civil society, with all its imperfections, is a blessing no Man
in

in his sober senses would willingly renounce.

THE infinite *Wisdom* and *Power* of God are manifest in *all* his works; and his infinite *Goodness* is demonstrated by the *manifest* tendency to *good* which pervades and influences the whole Universe of his creation; and which is equally prevalent in the *general* administration of human affairs. Why any *imperfection* or *evil* should be permitted to prevail in a system evidently proceeding from a Being of infinite Wisdom, Power and Goodness, is what our finite capacities can never comprehend: but thus much we may *clearly* discover, that if the Universe had been the production of an *evil* Being, he must have been infinitely *wise* and *powerful* to have accomplished it; but *infinite* wisdom and *infinite* power annexed to an *evil* principle, must produce *infinite evil*; which
is

is contrary to the *actual effect*; for in that case *all* order, harmony, and goodness, would have been *banished* from the creation; or, in other words, the creation itself must have been destroyed. Thus infinite Goodness *must* be united to infinite Wisdom and Power, to create and sustain a system which could not *exist* without Order and Harmony in its *material*, and *goodness* in its moral, Constitution. Could we conceive infinite Wisdom and Power to be united to an evil Principle (which however is a manifest absurdity) its *first* act would be to *erase* every vestige of order and goodness, i. e. to *destroy* the whole system of the Universe.

To suppose that the present system is the production of *two* different Principles, one infinitely *good*, the other infinitely *evil*, is as great an absurdity as atheism itself. For though we cannot,
by

by reason of our *finite* capacities, comprehend what infinity *is*, yet we can clearly discern that it *cannot* be *divisible*; and consequently can only be attributed to *one* supreme Being. To assert that *two infinitely* powerful Beings exist, is in fact to deny the existence of *any*; for *equality* necessarily implies *division*, as *contrariety* does *competition*; both which ideas are incompatible with *infinity*, which necessarily infers *Unity* and *Superiority*.—For if it were possible two *infinite* Powers, or two *equal* Powers, one *good*, the other *evil*, could *exist*, they could produce no *one* effect whatever, because they would *exactly* counterbalance each other. Thus the origin of evil can never be attributed solely to the existence of an *evil* Principle; for if such a Principle does exist, it must derive its *existence*, and *consequently* its power, from the only *supreme, independent, infinite* Cause of all things.

It

It is remarkable, that whenever the *Devil* is mentioned in scripture as an *Agent*, he is always described as a Being of *limited* power. Thus he could not tempt JOB without *permission*, and he desisted from tempting JESUS when he was *rebuked**.

SOME philosophers have attempted to account for the origin of *physical* evil, by a *necessity* arising from the *nature* of Matter. "Thus (say they) earthquakes and "tempests are necessary to purify the air, " &c." taking it for granted that there exists an *absolute necessity* for the material Creation to be constituted *exactly* as it is. But on *whom* is this necessity imposed?

* MILTON constantly represents Satan as a *limited* Being, particularly in the following passage, where the Archangel says,

"Satan, thou know'st my force, and I know thine;
"Neither our own, but given."

On

On the omnipotent Creator! And what imposes it? Dull, inactive Matter, which owes its *existence*, and all its properties to his Almighty Power!

THE infinite Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of God, do not require *such* vindications: and indeed those who ascribe Moral Evil to the agency of the Devil, or Man, and Physical Evil to the necessary imperfection of Matter, entertain very inadequate and *limited* ideas of the Attributes of God. He *cannot* be constrained by any *necessity*; nor can any thing exist independent of, much less *contrary* to, his *will*. - Why evil is permitted, we have not faculties to discover, and perhaps ought not to enquire.

FAITH should, in this instance, induce us to believe that "whatever is, is right." Reason has done its office;

it has convinced us that we, and all things animate and inanimate, are the creatures of a Being *infinite* in Wisdom, Power, and Goodness. If Reason has enabled us to discover indubitable and innumerable proofs of these divine *truths*, ought not *Faith* to assure us that the infinite *justice* of God will be equally apparent; and that this mystery of the origin of Evil, which is totally inexplicable by human understanding, will be revealed in some future period of our existence?

CONSIDERED in this point of view, the *unequal* dispensations of Providence in this present state, must afford to every serious and well-disposed mind a *convincing* and *incontrovertible proof* that there *will* be another state of existence; since to doubt it is to doubt the justice of God, which, as I had occasion to observe before, is *worse* than Atheism.

G

How

How pleasing and consolatory is this prospect of futurity to a wretch oppressed with poverty, age, infirmity, or any of those “miserics which groan for the “grave’s shelter!” and how strongly does it inculcate, that it is no less his interest than his duty to receive with humble submission the dispensations of Providence; and steadily to maintain through life a course of virtue and integrity, as far as the frailty of human nature will permit. *Fear, Envy, or Ambition*, will have but little influence on the mind of him who can regard this transitory world, and the busy scenes of life, in their *true* light. He will see the emptiness and vanity of riches, honours, and all the trifles that so anxiously engage the attention of those around him; he will know “that Man “walketh in a vain shadow, and disquieteth himself in vain:” Why then should he *envy* the prosperity of the wicked, or
dread

dread his own approaching dissolution, which is the period of his troubles? If he performs his duty to the best of his ability, he will have the approbation of his conscience, and will consider the *poverty* and *obscurity* of his condition on earth rather as favours than afflictions, when he sees of "how small estimation " riches and honours are held by Providence, who frequently bestows them on " the most *worthless* of his creatures*." The good man's wealth is the testimony of his conscience, which will not, like earthly acquisitions, desert him at the grave, but will accompany him to a state where its value will be duly regarded.

MR. ROUSSEAU seems fully convinced of the *necessity* of a future state, when he says, " Had I no other proof of the im-

* See Arbuthnot's Epitaph on Col. Chartres.

“materiality of the soul than the oppress-
 “sion of the just and the triumph of the
 “wicked in this world, this *alone* would
 “prevent my having the least doubt of
 “it. So shocking a *discord* amidst the
 “general harmony of things, would make
 “me naturally look out for the *cause*. I
 “should say to myself, We do not cease
 “to exist with this life †.”

THIS reasoning is certainly just and
 conclusive; but how can it be reconciled
 with his observation, before taken notice
 of, “that the abuse a man makes of his
 “liberty is not of *importance* enough to
 “disturb the general *order* of the uni-
 “verse;” and “that the evil done by
 “Man *falls upon his own head*, without
 “*making any change* in the system of the
 “world, without hindering the human
 “species from being preserved in spite of

† Page 65 and 66.

“them-

“themselves*.” And again, “Our
 “cares, our anxiety, our griefs, are all
 “owing to ourselves.” — “Moral evil is
 “incontestably our *own work*, and phy-
 “cal would in fact be *nothing*, did not our
 “vices render us sensible of it.”

As I have cited these passages *already*,
 and endeavoured to shew that this mode of
 reasoning, which attempts to prove the
equality of the administration of human
 affairs, is absurd and fallacious; I should
 not have introduced them again, had it
 not been to convince the reader, that Mr.
 ROUSSEAU has himself directly contra-
 dicted them in the quotation from page 65
 The inconsistency in his arguments is evi-
 dent; for if it be admitted that there are
 no *physical evils* in the world, and that all
moral evil is occasioned by the vices and

* Page 60 and 61.

follies of Man, and falls upon the heads of those who produce it, without making any change in the moral system of the world, the *justice* of Providence is *vindicated on earth*; and *then* there cannot be any argument in favour of a future state deduced from the *inequality* in the administration of human affairs. Our author *must* therefore be *mistaken* in maintaining these *contradictory* opinions; and it is no unfair conclusion to assert, that he *gives up* that which he *at first* supported, when he founds his *strongest* argument for a future state on the *inequality* of the dispensations of Providence in *this*.



THE next subject adverted to in the Savoyard Curate's Profession of Faith is that of the *creating* power of God; on which he takes occasion to say, "The idea
" of *creation* confounds me, and *surpasses*
" my

"my *conception*, though I believe *as much*
 "of it as I am able to conceive *." How
much a man may be able to *conceive* of an
 idea which confounds him and *surpasses*
 his *conception*, may be very difficult to as-
 certain; and if it had not too much the
 air of *pertness* and ill-timed *levity* on so
serious a subject, it might be said the Cu-
 rate's faith in *creation* might be collected
 from this short period; for if it *surpasses*
 his *conception*, and he believes *only* as
 much of it as he conceives, he does not
 believe it *at all*. But he says, a little fur-
 ther in the same page, "All that I con-
 "ceive is, that God existed *before* all
 "things; that he exists with them, and
 "will exist after them, if they should
 "ever have an end. That a Being whose
 "essence is inconceivable should give ex-
 "istence to other Beings, is at best obscure
 "and incomprehensible to our ideas; but

* Page 75.

G 4

"that

“ that *something* and *nothing* should be
 “ reciprocally converted into each other,
 “ is a palpable contradiction, a most ma-
 “ nifest absurdity.”

How palpably and manifestly does Mr. ROUSSEAU *contradict* himself in this short quotation, where he says, at the beginning of the paragraph, “ All I conceive is, that God existed *before* all things;” and concludes, “ but that something and nothing should be reciprocally converted into each other, is a palpable contradiction, a most manifest absurdity.” If he conceives that God existed *before* all things, it must necessarily follow that God *created* all things, *i. e.* *produced all things out of nothing*; which is the true meaning of the word *creation*; and this conclusion, so far from being a *contradiction* or *absurdity*, is as clearly and demonstrably *certain* as any propo-
 propo-

proposition in Euclid. But if the premises ("that God existed *before* all "things") are *denied*, the consequence is obvious and inevitable; that all things *co existed* with him from all eternity, and therefore did not *derive* their existence from him; which is too absurd an opinion for any rational man to maintain.

WE see the necessity of believing *one* of the following propositions—either that God originally created something out of nothing—or that the universe, which is manifestly but an *effect*, must have *existed* from all eternity *without* a cause, or be itself the *cause* of its *own* existence. The idea of creation, it must be confessed, *exceeds* our comprehension; but that of an *effect* existing without a *cause*, or causing *itself* to exist, is a flat *contradiction* to common sense; or, in the words of Mr. ROUSSEAU, "a most manifest absurdity."

WHERE human reason clearly points out to us the certain and necessary existence of those powers in the Deity whose *mode* of operation we cannot comprehend, *faith* should induce us to believe they *do exist* and *operate*; though this truth must appear a mystery to us. Thus, when we are told that God is a *self-existent* Being, we see the necessity of assenting to a proposition which *exceeds* our understanding, to avoid admitting what manifestly contradicts it. Why then should we hesitate to believe, that God created all things out of nothing, since our reason convinces us there is a palpable *absurdity* in maintaining the *contrary* opinion, and an absolute necessity for adopting one or the other; for there is *no medium*? The rule prescribed by our author is *here* peculiarly applicable: “Unanswerable objections
“ might be made to all systems, because
“ the *human understanding* is incapable of
“ resolving

“ resolving them. Ought not that system then to be preferred which explains every thing, when attended with no greater difficulties than the rest * ? ”



MAN, by his nature, inclined to be virtuous, just, and humane.

SEVERAL pertinent instances adduced in proof of this assertion, and sensible arguments urged in its support †.



RESIGNATION to the will and dispensations of Providence recommended as the surest means to obtain happiness ‡.

EVERY appearance, both in the moral and physical constitution of things in this world, plainly indicates to an attentive mind, that the existence of Man is not intended by the great Creator to terminate

* See Page 26. † Page 77 to 91. ‡ Page 92 to 99.

with his corporeal dissolution; or, as it is commonly called, his *death*: consequently, those who extend their views of felicity no farther than to earthly objects, are engaged in a vain pursuit, which must be attended with anxiety and disappointment. Interest therefore concurs with reason and virtue in persuading us to withdraw our affections from the transitory enjoyments and possessions of this world, and look forward to futurity. I would by no means be understood to censure those who in moderation partake of the innocent pleasures and enjoyments of life; all I contend for is, that Man ought not to *confine* his thoughts and wishes *entirely* to this uncertain and fleeting period of his existence. Were there no obstacles to the accomplishment of our most sanguine hopes and desires, we should not be made happy even by obtaining them. The restless nature of the human mind, always
aspirin g

aspiring to objects beyond its reach, and as it were *expanding* itself to futurity, would be unsatisfied with its present possessions, and would stamp an imaginary though inestimable value on remote objects, merely on account of their absence. PRIOR, in his philosophic and pleasing Poem intitled "Alma," takes frequent occasion to *remark* this restless disposition of the mind of Man. The *Moral* to "The Ladle," by the same ingenious author, exactly describes the situation of those who, because they fill the most exalted stations, are the objects of envy on account of their supposed happiness; and at the same time shews the *insufficiency* of all earthly acquisitions to produce it. The conclusion of this *Moral* brings the subject home to every man's breast; for who is there, from the highest to the lowest, that does not feel the want of a something unpossessed,

which

which is conceived to be essential to his happiness?

“ Against our peace we arm our will ;

“ Amidst our plenty, *something* still

“ For horses, houses, pictures, planting,

“ To thee, to me, to him, is wanting.

“ That *cruel something* unpossess’d

“ Corrodes, and leavens all the rest :

“ That *something*, if we cou’d obtain,

“ Wou’d soon create a future pain :

“ And to the Coffin from the Cradle,

“ ’Tis all a *wish*, and all a Ladle.”

PRIOR.

PRIOR had perhaps, in one respect, the advantage of all his illustrious cotemporaries; for he had the singular talent of conveying the strongest sense and the most profound knowledge of human nature in the easy and engaging style of familiar Dialogue and Fable: Of this his “Alma” and his Tales are pleasing and incontestable proofs. But to return to EMILY.

AT

AT page 98, the Curate *stops* in his profession of faith, which however he soon resumes, and proceeds from the consideration of *natural* religion to that of *Christianity*. He uses the utmost freedom in objecting to the *necessity* of a divine revelation, to the prophecies, to miracles, to the historical evidence, and, in short, to every kind of proof that has been adduced in support of the truth of the Christian religion.

AFTER going through 36 pages in this sceptical style, he concludes his observations on this subject by a *just* and animated, though short, panegyric on the life and death of Jesus Christ; in which, among other strong expressions, is the following very *remarkable* sentence, and certainly very inconsistent with the opinions advanced in the preceding pages: "Yes, if the life and death of SOCRATES

“are those of a Sage, the life and death
“of JESUS are those of a God.”

As there is nothing *new* in the many objections advanced by the Savoyard Curate against the credibility of Christianity, nor in the few arguments he urges in favour of it, I shall forbear to make any observations on what he has thought proper to say on this subject; though whoever reads with attention this celebrated “Profession of Faith” may easily collect the opinion of its author.

REVELATION is, in its common acceptation, a very *indefinite* term, and has been used by various sects to express different, and sometimes contrary, doctrines; therefore no man can form an idea of its precise meaning, unless it is previously defined. Revelation, in its primary sense, means, *an unveiling, or plain discovery*. But
it

it must depart in some degree from its original signification, when it is indiscriminately used to express the particular tenets adopted by any one sect of Christians, in opposition to the rest. For whatever mysteries have been thus *unveiled* or *plainly discovered*, must be believed by *all* to whom they are made known; they are the same as *self-evident* propositions, which cannot admit of *doubt*. Revelation therefore, when applied to the Christian religion, can only comprehend those truths which *all* sects of Christians *agree* to believe; for it would be a manifest absurdity to assert, that those points wherein they *differ* are clearly and fully *revealed*. The following short dialogue between a Parish-Priest and one of his Parishioners will shew the necessity of defining the precise meaning of the term *Revelation*, in any argument upon the subject of the Christian religion.

PRIEST.

PRIEST. Do you believe in Revelation?

PARISHIONER. I do not understand your question.

PR. I mean the divine Revelation of the Christian religion.

PAR. Explain what you mean by the Christian religion.

PR. I mean the religion taught by Jesus Christ.

PAR. Before I can give you an explicit answer, I must know what are the doctrines of that religion.

PR. They are fully explained in the Articles of the Established Church of —, of which I am a Priest.

PAR. I thought they had been *revealed* from *Heaven*, and contained in the *New Testament*.

PR. So they are, to be sure.

PAR. Then what is the reason there are so many *different sects* among Christians?

PR. Be-

PR. Because the New Testament is *variously* interpreted.

PAR. Do you then assert that any doctrine can be *revealed* which is variously interpreted? Or have you the presumption to say, that truths revealed by Heaven itself, can admit of *various* interpretations?

PR. I do not say any such thing.

PAR. But you say the New Testament is variously interpreted, therefore——

PR. Stop! you run on too fast.

PAR. The conclusion follows from your *own* premises: but please to explain this mystery, and inform me, how a revelation said to be come from God can admit of *different* explanations, or need *any* explanation at all?

PR. The difficulty arises from your not understanding what I mean by *Revelation*.

PAR. I

PAR. I beg your pardon : please to explain.

PR. By Revelation I mean the doctrines of the Christian religion, as *declared* by the Church of — — * to be contained in the New Testament.

PAR. Now I clearly understand you ; it is the Revelation of the Christian religion by the Church of — — that you require me to believe.

PR. Certainly.

PAR. What, then, have all the *various* Churches and Sects into which Christians are divided, a right to make a Revelation out of the New Testament as well as your Church ?

PR. No.

* The Reader may fill up the blank by inserting any Church of which he is a Member, since they all pretend to exercise the *exclusive* right of interpretation.

PAR. They

PAR. They all assert that they *have* an undoubted right to *explain* the Scriptures, and *each* particular Sect that the *only* true *explanation* of *divine Revelation* contained in the Holy Scriptures is given by *them*.

PR. But *we* insist upon it that *our's* is the only true Church, that the rest are Schismatics and Heretics, and that *our* interpretation of the Scripture is the *only true Revelation*, which I therefore require you to believe on pain of etern—

PAR. I must stop you, ere you pronounce your *horrid* anathema, and I *now* faithfully promise to believe *any* Revelation you please to *make* for me, when you prove the assertions advanced in your *last* sentence.

PR. I shall do that some *other* time; so for the present farewell.

THE excellent system of Morality taught and practised by Jesus Christ, and
the

the *internal* evidence of Christianity, are the strongest proofs of its divine origin. The precepts of humility and universal benevolence, of “good-will towards men” and peace upon earth,” which the Christian religion not only *inculcates*, but, if strictly adhered to, is evidently calculated to *produce*; and its general tendency to promote the happiness of mankind, both here and hereafter, gives it an indisputable pre-eminence to every other system of religion that has been promulgated; and the various sects of Christians, however they differ in other points, must all agree in admitting the precepts of morality and practical religion, inculcated by Jesus Christ, to be strictly conformable to reason and truth, and exactly coincident with the *internal* impulse of their own consciences.

UNIVERSAL

UNIVERSAL assent is perhaps the *only* proof that can demonstrate any system of religion to be a Revelation from Heaven ; and it is no less certain than it is remarkable, that the practical and moral doctrines of the Christian religion need only be made known to any inhabitant of the Globe, who is endued with common understanding, to be *instantly* believed. But let the *mystery* of transubstantiation, or the various legends of Roman Catholic superstition, be proposed to the same person, as articles of his Creed, and he would be so far from believing them, that it would be extremely difficult to convince him they were not proposed to insult or delude his understanding.—It was from such absurd adulterations that the various sects among Christians, and even *Mahometism* itself, arose. Craft and enthusiasm concurred to substitute mystery for truth, and superstition for religion ; and the Roman Pontiffs,

Pontiffs, artfully and wickedly availing themselves of these powerful auxiliaries, corrupted Christianity, and prostituted it to sanctify a system of spiritual Tyranny which for many Centuries ravaged and desolated Europe, causing the most destructive wars, and exercising the most horrid and bloody persecutions, in the name of the pacific and merciful JESUS !

INSTEAD of following his instructions, or endeavouring to copy his perfect example, His pretended "Vicars on Earth*" disgraced his Religion by their conduct, and blasphemed it by their idolatrous superstition. The mixture of absurd opinions and atrocious crimes produced by ecclesiastical Craft and Bigotry, affords a melancholy and humiliating proof of the ignorance and depravity universally

* The title assumed by the Pope.

prevail-

prevailing, even in the most civilized and enlightened Quarter of the Globe, through many preceding Centuries.

THE spiritual demagogues of those times knew the precepts of Christianity to be incompatible with the schemes of worldly power, wealth, and grandeur, which they were determined to pursue; and therefore they invented the most absurd and incredible Mysteries, and boldly asserted that *faith* in these, was preferable to a holy life; and that he who could believe the most palpable contradictions, was in the certain road to Heaven. Thus if the people admitted that the Priest could, by pronouncing certain words, transform Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, it was sufficient for their salvation, and they had no occasion to regulate their conduct by his precepts and example.

H

THE

THE numerous victims who have been sacrificed to that *infernal Fury*, fanatic Superstition, have suffered, not for their *actions*, but for their *opinions*; and what shews the madness and folly of the human mind, when infected with enthusiasm, in the strongest light is, that the various Sects, as they have gained the ascendancy, have been equally *ready* to persecute their opponents, and frequently to inflict on the miserable victims of their fury, the *very same* tortures of which themselves had so loudly complained; by which it is evident, they were so far from thinking it *unjust* to inflict *torments* on their fellow-creatures, because they happened to differ from them in *opinion*, that they conceived by such conduct they were rendering *acceptable* service to God; and each Sect being convinced they were infallibly *right*, maintained that they ought to enjoy the *exclusive privilege* of persecuting
the

the rest.—Thanks be to Almighty God! the hellish spirit of persecution, which has for many ages usurped and disgraced the name of Christianity, is now in a great measure subdued; though the absurdities and superstitions which it patronized and propagated, are still retained, in a greater or less degree, in every religious establishment throughout Europe*.

THE glorious Reformation was the means appointed by Providence to communicate the inestimable blessings of civil and religious liberty to those nations where its influence extended.

* This paragraph was written before that infamous week in June, 1780; an æra so disgraceful to Britain, that every lover of his country would be glad to have it erased from her annals, or consigned it to eternal oblivion.

NOR were these benefits confined to them only; their progress, though slow in its beginning, has been gradually accelerated, and nearly in an equal proportion. Many collateral causes, needless here to enumerate, but easily to be traced by an attentive observer of the History of Europe, have contributed to the expansion and diffusion of civil and religious liberty. I mention them *together*, because they are often, though not always, intimately connected.--In the course of human affairs, contrary effects generally originate from opposite causes. Thus persecution proceeded from *bigotry*, and toleration from *scepticism*. But bigotry and scepticism are *themselves* no more than second causes; the first being evidently founded in *ignorance*, the latter in *knowledge*. By *knowledge*, I would not wish to be understood to mean an intimate acquaintance with the nature and essence of material
and

and spiritual Beings, or with the various properties and springs by which they are actuated (for such kind of knowledge is unattainable, and perhaps useless to Man) but merely a frequent *exercise* of the *rational* faculty, a liberal mode of thinking, and a great accession of ideas. Knowledge, in this sense of the word, was greatly increased and diffused by the art of Printing. Before this useful and ingenious invention was made known, History, Philosophy, the Polite Arts, and, in fine, all human learning, was confined to very narrow bounds; and it was the interest of the Clergy, in whom it chiefly centered, to prevent its extension, and to keep the laity in ignorance.

ROME was, at the commencement of the reign of HENRY VIII. of England, the Mistress of Christendom. But that most merciless and brutal Tyrant was the in-

strument employed by Providence, to humble this antient and haughty Empress of the world.

THE papal authority received a wound at the Reformation of which it has languished ever since; and which must at length effect its dissolution. Excommunications, Interdicts, and the dreadful fulminations of the Vatican, had, till this auspicious æra, kept the most fierce and powerful Princes in awe; and their wretched subjects experienced a species of slavery unknown to the remote ages which preceded the promulgation of Christianity. The *alliance* between Church and State is perhaps as *antient* as Monarchy itself; and we are informed by History, that Heathen Tyrants were too well acquainted with the utility of Priestcraft in promoting their designs, to suffer so powerful an engine to remain neglected.

lected.—Antient Rome was frequently indebted to her Priests and Augurs for her victories; and however the story of the *sacred Geese* whose *cackling* saved the Capitol, may be delivered to us, it is very possible some *mythological* meaning may be concealed under this *fable*, expressive of the influence that priestcraft and superstition always have upon the ignorant multitude.

THE infernal league in which the Pope and the several Crowned Heads in Europe were united for the purpose of *enslaving* their subjects, differed in one material circumstance from all systems of Tyranny before known: for it had always been an article in the alliance between Church and State, that the *Priest*, though a *partaker* in the spoil and the despotism, should be inferior and subservient to the Monarch. But the Roman Pontiff *reversed* this long

established rule; and reserved to *himself* the peculiar privilege of exercising unlimited power over the souls of Kings and subjects, while the former were no more than his vicegerents in Tyranny.

WHILE this formidable alliance continued, the people were bound in shackles of slavery too strong for their utmost efforts to break or unloose; but no sooner did these mighty confederates clash, than their power was broken. When HENRY the Eighth declared himself *Supreme* Head, or Pope of the Church of England, Excommunications, Interdicts, and all the spiritual artillery of Rome were mere *brutum fulmen*. Impotent in themselves, and deriving force and activity from the *credulity* of the People, which was their vital principle, they sunk to their original lifeless state the moment it was withdrawn; though, while it animated them, they

they produced the most dreadful effects, and compleatly answered the purpose of their existence.

THAT system of spiritual Tyranny is sure to be established, which can possess its adherents with a *belief* that it is able at once to *damn* for the slightest offences, and to *absolve* the greatest of crimes; and however ridiculous such doctrines may be in themselves, they are likely to be generally received, when they are enforced by the unanswerable arguments of tortures and flames.

So long as ecclesiastical oppression received weight from the *secular arm*, and the deluded and ignorant people were convinced that the powers assumed by the Pope were entrusted to him by Heaven, they tamely submitted to his authority,

H 5

which

which was not maintained by its own strength, but by their weakness.

At the Reformation, those opinions which formed the basis of Papal Tyranny, and which had been constantly supported in *this* as well as other Countries, by the most severe and horrid tortures that ingenious cruelty could invent, or deliberate unrelenting malice inflict, were openly *decried*, and exposed to public derision.

THE people then saw that power they had always been taught to revere as derived from Heaven, trampled on; and those objects before which they had been accustomed to prostrate themselves with idolatrous adoration, torn from their *high places*, and exposed to the scorn of their late suppliants. Thus the mist of bigotry was dispelled, their prospects were enlarged, and their blind credulity and ridiculous

lous veneration of things in themselves mean and contemptible, was greatly impaired. HENRY, it must be acknowledged, employed with success the ancient engines of tyranny and persecution to maintain and establish that Supremacy he had transferred from the Pope to Himself; but the obedience he thus *extorted*, was that arising from *fear* without *reverence*: his people dared not *deny* those opinions they could not *believe*; though they dreaded his power, they despised his pretensions; and inwardly laughed at a supremacy which could *so easily* be transferred from Heaven to the Pope, and from him to the vilest of men.

THE seeds of civil and religious Liberty sown in his wicked and oppressive reign, had taken deep root in Britain: the ancient *foundations* of spiritual and temporal

Tyranny were *exposed* to public view; the fabric which had withstood the shocks of time for so many centuries, trembled to its base; and it seems highly probable, that the present generation may be witnesses of its total destruction.

BUT it is by no means my intention to trace the progress of civil and religious Liberty, from the Reformation to the present time. Suffice it therefore to observe, that they are gradually extending their benign influence throughout Europe; and notwithstanding the ignorant cant of Enthusiasts, or the crafty declamations of pretended Patriots, Great Britain enjoys at this day the blessings of *civil Liberty* and *religious Toleration* in a more ample and extensive degree than any other nation under heaven*.

SOME

* This was written before the late destructive riots commenced; but I have too much regard for the

SOME established mode of public worship must be supported by Government in preference to the rest; for though the simple truths of natural and revealed Religion are sufficiently obvious to speculative men, whose situation in life gives them leisure to indulge contemplation, yet the lower orders of society are precluded from these advantages by various causes.

THE only ideas they can have of Religion, they must receive from others; and hence arises the manifest and unavoidable necessity to have a National Establishment, and a peculiar order of

the *honour* of my Country to suppose that short paroxysm of popular phrensy a contradiction to my assertion, any more than an earthquake is to the general œconomy of Nature.

men

men to instruct the people in the great and important truths of Religion.

It is undoubtedly of the utmost consequence to the well-being of a State, that every member should be convinced of the certainty of God's existence, and of a future state of retribution; since, without such conviction, *human laws* are no more than *cobwebs*.

THAT the established form of worship in England is exempt from error, no one even of its most zealous advocates can be so hardy as to maintain. That many of its errors might be reformed, is certainly true.—But even in its present imperfect state, it is capable of producing very salutary effects, in regulating the conduct and reforming the manners of the people, if its Ministers would regulate their conduct by the doctrines they preach, and
profess

profess to believe. That there are, in
 so large a body of men, many whose ex-
 amples are useful expositions of their pre-
 cepts, and whose lives are continual in-
 structions to their parishioners, I with
 pleasure acknowledge; and the *effects* of
 their exemplary behaviour are fully ade-
 quate to the most sanguine expectations.
 There cannot be a more truly valuable
 member of society, or a more respectable
 character, than that of a good Clergy-
 man; and such a man will never fail to
 meet with the regard due to his merit,
 if indeed the times are so bad as to make
 the performance of an indispensable *duty*
 meritorious. On the other hand, truth
 obliges me to say, that too many of the
 Clergy shamefully neglect the great duties
 of their holy profession; and it is much
 to be feared, from the bad examples
 these unworthy members of the Church
 set before the eyes of their congregations,
 that

that Religion will in a short time be considered even by the lowest order of society, as a mere matter of form.

To a moderate and rational man it would be of small concern what particular sect of Christians the Government adhered to, in establishing a National Church, provided Popery *, which has always been *inimical* to our civil and religious liberties, be excluded from this peculiar distinction; and that the Establishment strongly inculcates a belief in and reverence for the Deity, a firm conviction of

* Toleration, and an *exemption from persecution* on account of his religion, every Roman Catholic has an undoubted *right* to expect from a Government constituted on the principles of *civil* and religious *liberty*. But experience has sufficiently shewn, that any thing like an *establishment* of Popery would be extremely detrimental, if not absolutely destructive, to our excellent Constitution.

a fu-

a future state of rewards and punishments, and a strict observance of moral and religious duties as the only means of obtaining happiness here and hereafter.

It is, perhaps, of little importance to the community at large, whether the National Establishment is Episcopal, Presbyterian, or Independent; but it is highly necessary that it be restrained from *persecuting** those who *dissent* from it; “that its Ministers should act in strict conformity to their profession;” and that the great and important *trust* of instructing the people in their religious duties should be by no

* Persecution may make *many* hypocrites; but so ill is it calculated to promote the designs of those who employ it, that nothing contributes so much to the *increase* of any sect as that moderate degree of it which the lenity of our laws admits of.

means

means made a matter of traffic, but confided to worthy and conscientious men.

“ For modes of faith let furious bigots fight ;

“ His can’t be wrong whose *life* is in the right.”

POPE.

It is time to put a period to this digression, into which I have been insensibly led by the concluding subject of the Savoyard Curate’s Profession of Faith, which ends at the 154th page of this 3d volume. In my remarks on this celebrated part of Mr. ROUSSEAU’s work, I have been much more attentive to the *matter* than the mode of expression ; and from a similitude and connection visible in many of the important subjects he has discussed, I have found it very difficult to avoid frequent repetition.

If I have *erred* in those points wherein I have presumed to differ from a writer of such superior abilities, I am open to *conviction* ;

viction; and shall always be ready to retract any opinions, or to give up any arguments, which cannot be supported by just and rational deduction; having no further interest in them, than I derive from their apparent conformity to *truth*.

I HOPE the candid reader will remember, that it is not consistent with the *plan* of this Essay to follow the author step by step through his performance; and if in the course of these Remarks he frequently meets with matter not immediately connected with the work itself, he is requested to consider, it is my *intention* rather to *pursue* the *subjects* discussed by Mr. ROUSSEAU, than to adhere to the exact *method* in which he has treated them.

IN conformity to this design, I now return to EMILIUS.

OUR

Our author very justly prefers “ the
 “ simple affecting eloquence of the an-
 “ tients, speaking frequently by signs in
 “ the most expressive manner, and address-
 “ ing the heart through the medium of the
 “ senses, to the meretricious ornaments of
 “ modern oratory, or poetry * ; and ad-
 “ duces some pertinent instances from An-
 “ tient History in support of this opi-
 “ nion † .”

SHAKESPEARE, who was perhaps, with-
 out exception, the greatest natural genius
 the world ever produced, and possessed the
 strongest powers of *describing* † and af-
 fecting the passions of the human mind,
 adopted “ the simple and expressive elo-
 “ quence of the antients,” in his liveliest

* Page 178.

† Ibid.

‡ For a proof of this assertion, see his *Othello*,
 in which the passion of Jealousy, in its various de-
 grees, is no less accurately than feelingly described.

descrip-

descriptions, and most animated and interesting scenes. He always avoided art, and followed *nature*, of whose powerful operations on the human mind he had the clearest and strongest conception.

NUMBERLESS instances of this native, simple, and resistless eloquence, speaking immediately to the *heart*, might be produced from the various dramatic productions of this immortal genius; but a few will suffice to shew the peculiar excellence in his method of description. The Tragedy of Macbeth, however it may deviate from the Grecian rules of dramatic perfection, and notwithstanding its *Witches* and *Goblins* have been ridiculed by foreigners, who pretend to discern the blemishes, though they are blind to the beauties of our illustrious Bard, is exactly adapted to the *manners and opinions* of the people for whom it was written, and
abounds

abounds with examples of the amazing force of SHAKESPEARE'S genius.

IN the scenes between Macbeth and his Queen, his reluctance to murder Duncan, her artful persuasions to induce him to it, the dreadful circumstances attending this horrid deed, and the terrors of his guilty conscience after he has committed it, are described in the most natural and simple, yet in the most strong and lively manner.

It is impossible to see these scenes well acted, or even to read them, without feeling in some degree the same sensations and emotions as we should were we spectators of the *real* transaction; or rather, it is scarce possible to conceive we are *not* so.

YET in what artless language are these lively ideas conveyed? Modern poets would

would have introduced, on such an occasion, a profusion of imagery, metaphor, and laboured description. By this method the sensibility of the *audience* would be scarcely affected, and the *reader's* attention would be employed in examining the aptitude of the similes, the justness of the description, or the harmony of the verse.

IN the same Tragedy, the scene in which Lady Macbeth appears walking in her sleep, conveys the most lively idea of the horrors of a guilty conscience, though the most simple and natural expressions are employed. Again : how strongly are the operations of paternal affection, joined to *extreme woe*, expressed by a single line spoken by Macduff on being informed of the murder of his children ! He only says,

“ What, all my little ones ! Did you say, All ? ”

Some poets would have written a page on
this

this occasion, but could they have excited the keen sensations of unutterable tenderness and distress which must arise in the mind of every parent who hears or reads this single line, and imagines it applicable to *himself*? The sensations excited by SHAKESPEARE can only be *felt*, it is impossible to describe them.

MR. ROUSSEAU's sentiments exactly coincide with the opinion advanced in the former part of these Remarks concerning the powerful and beneficial influence of a virtuous affection on the mind of a youth: and he justly censures the impropriety of endeavouring to prevent it, or to obstruct its progress*.

SUCH conduct in parents is unjust and cruel, besides being in the highest de-

* Page 192.

gree absurd; for they can only hope to effect their purpose by the influence which the abject passion of fear, or the sordid motive of avarice, may have on the mind of their child. But if he should be mean enough to withdraw his affection from its *virtuous* and beloved object, his parents would have very little reason to congratulate themselves on their triumph; for if they have a spark of spirit or generosity in their souls, they must *despise* the mean heart of a youth, who could be capable of acting on such unworthy and mercenary principles: and should parental partiality induce them to continue their regard for him, after this instance of his baseness, how must it grieve them to think they have, by their imprudent, short-sighted, worldly wisdom, either destroyed his future prospects of happiness, by forcing him to pursue a conduct he *cannot* approve, or eradicated every

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gene-

generous principle from his soul, by inducing him to adopt *their* sentiments! In the first case, he will constantly reproach himself with his breach of fidelity, his ingratitude, and his cruelty, to her he thought worthy to possess his sincere and early love, and who probably has shewn herself *deserving* of his constant regard, by fixing her undeviating affection on him: his active youthful imagination will increase his affliction, by representing to him in the most lively colours her charms, her love, her injuries, and her despair; and at the same time will give him the bright reverse of this gloomy picture, by suggesting the flattering, and to him, distracting idea of the felicity he *might* have enjoyed himself, and communicated to her, had he pursued a more just and manly conduct. Unable to endure the anguish of his mind, dissatisfied with himself and all around him, he
might

might fly to the various scenes of debauchery to banish reflection, or in search of that happiness they have not to bestow.

SUCH would probably be the fate of a youth who had sensibility to see his conduct in its true light. But if we suppose him *mean* enough to be happy in exchanging the *noblest* for the most *sordid* of human principles; his heart, *estranged* from love, will be *contracted* by avarice, envy, craft, and all the dirty passions which predominate in base degenerate souls, which are not only more odious and contemptible, but generally more pernicious in their effects than sensual appetites.

AN unbounded indulgence of these is too frequently the foible of generous minds, actuated by the sudden impulse of some peculiar temptation, seduced by the alluring power of bad example, or stimulated by a youthful and vigorous

constitution. Yet such libertines may possibly be reclaimed by the force of rational argument, or even by their own cool reflection, if they allow themselves an opportunity for thought. Their appetites, palled by *satiety*, may nauseate what they lately coveted ; or the disorders attendant on a course of intemperance and debauchery may awaken reason : but if nothing else effects a reformation, increasing age will probably deprive them of the ability, if not of the inclination to indulge many of those appetites to which their youth was devoted.

ON the contrary, they whose minds are corrupted by *avarice*, and the diabolical passions which are its inseparable companions, have little probability of being reformed. Increasing years add strength to their evil propensities, and rivet the chains of their inexorable tyrant. As their
wealth

wealth accumulates, their minds contract, and the fruits of their riches are misery, envy, and contempt.

As I have, in the former part of these Remarks, considered the beneficial effects likely to be produced in a young mind by a virtuous love, fixed on a proper object, I shall not now expatiate on this subject. Suffice it to observe, that it is impossible to *eradicate* the passions implanted in the human breast by the Author of our nature; and it would, in this particular instance, be absurd and impious to attempt it; since it would be endeavouring to violate the first great law of nature, and to counteract the manifest design of Providence. But though this powerful incentive (universally prevalent among Mankind) was intended for our ultimate happiness, as well as for the continuance of the human race, and neither can nor ought to, be

subdued, it may under the guidance of reason be *directed* to the best and most beneficial purposes. Parents should therefore be very careful that they do not, by their injudicious attempts to restrain or subdue this passion, divert it from its proper channel.



“GENERALLY speaking, those people who know little, talk much; and those who know much, talk little: it is natural for a blockhead to think the little he knows important, and to tell it to all the world. But the man of knowledge does not open his packet so readily: he has too much to say, and is sensible that much more may be said after him; he therefore remains silent*.”
The above observation is not the less true

* Page 218.

for

for being common: PRIOR expresses the same thought in the two following lines:

“It is remarkable, that they

“Talk most, who have the least to say.”

THE author, with a very just degree of severity and contempt, exposes the folly and dissipation of the fashionable world in France—

“How happy for us, that it is not at home.”

SWIFT.

He censures them for the improper use they make of wealth, and evidently proves the impossibility of obtaining happiness on the plan they pursue*.

A VERY different and perfectly rational mode of life recommended to them; and a picturesque and animated description of

* Page 240 to 246.

the rural pleasures Mr. ROUSSEAU proposes to himself, in his method of spending his time*. The whole passage is written with that liveliness of imagination and elegance of style for which his works are so eminently distinguished, and so justly admired. The subject naturally leading him to notice the *Game Laws*, he makes many just remarks on their tyranny and oppression: if they are in any degree so arbitrary and severe in France as they are in England, he cannot say too much against them. All regulations must be contrary to equity, which attempt, in direct opposition to the general laws of nature, to assign to any peculiar rank or to any separate body in society, an exclusive property in those birds of the air, and beasts of the chase, which fences and inclosures cannot confine, and which, for

* Page 259 to 262.

that

that reason, manifestly appear to have been intended as a *common* benefit to all : this every man of understanding must be convinced of ; and if he is not a slave to interest or prejudice, he will readily *admit* that to be true, which he knows cannot be otherwise.

I 5

REMARKS.

REMARKS

ON THE

FOURTH AND LAST VOLUME.

“**L**OVE of ornament and show dis-
“**L** plays itself very early in Girls,
“as is evident from their fondness of
“Dolls, and their dexterity in dressing
“them*.” “The perverseness and ill-
“nature of the women serve only to
“aggravate their own misfortunes, and
“the misconduct of their husbands.

“**W**HEN they give way to rage, they
“forget themselves; for though they may

* Page 26.

“ often

“ often have reason to complain, they
 “ are always in the wrong to scold : each
 “ sex should preserve its proper tone
 “ and manner. A meek husband may
 “ make a wife impertinent ; but mild-
 “ ness on the woman’s side, will always
 “ bring a man back to reason, at least if
 “ he be not absolutely a brute, and will
 “ sooner or later triumph over him *.”

MR. ROUSSEAU makes many sensible reflections on the common practice of teaching children to give formal answers to questions they cannot understand ; and attempts to form a more intelligible catechism for them to learn †.

“ MAKE not your daughters Theolo-
 “ gists nor Disputants ;—accustom them
 “ to think themselves always in the fight

* Page 33. † Page 52 to 58.

“ of the Deity ; to reflect that he is con-
 “ stantly a witness of their actions, their
 “ pleasures, their thoughts : use them to
 “ do good without ostentation, because it
 “ will be pleasing to God ; to suffer with-
 “ out murmuring, because he will recom-
 “ pense them ; and in short to be, during
 “ every hour of their lives, such as they
 “ would wish to be in that hour when
 “ they shall appear before him in judg-
 “ ment.

“ Such is the true Religion, that only
 “ which is not capable of being abused,
 “ and admits neither of impiety nor fana-
 “ ticism *.”

THE following paragraph exactly des-
 cribes the effects of what is called a polite,
 because it is a fashionable Education, and

* Page 61 and 62.

points out its pernicious consequences to society.

“ It is in the house of our parents that
 “ we must contract a relish for our own
 “ family; and every woman who has not
 “ been educated by her Mother, will not
 “ chuse to bring up her own children.—
 “ Unhappily, private Education is banish-
 “ ed from great Cities.—Society is become
 “ so general, and so intermixed, that
 “ there is no asylum left for retirement;
 “ and we live in public, even in our own
 “ houses. In consequence of associating
 “ with all the world, we have no longer
 “ any family, and we scarce know our
 “ own relations: we see them as strangers,
 “ and the simplicity of domestic manners is
 “ lost, together with that agreeable fami-
 “ liarity which constitutes its principal
 “ charm. Thus we imbibe, with our
 “ very milk, a relish for the pleasures of
 “ the

“the age, and of the maxims which prevail in the world *.”

SUCH is the present state of polite society, evidently resulting from an improper mode of education, which seems calculated to inspire a love of dissipation, folly, and extravagance, and a dislike to the rational enjoyments of domestic life. Accordingly, it is apparent that those of either sex who are constant attendants at places of public diversion, or genteel resort, are seldom known to be either happy or respectable in the matrimonial state.



THE opinions I have ventured to advance on the subject of Love (by which I mean the passion described by Mr. ROUSSEAU) very nearly correspond with the sentiments he has expressed in the following quotation:

* Page 79.

THERE

"THERE is no true love without
 "enthusiasm, and no enthusiasm without
 "an object of perfection, either real or
 "imaginary. *Love I confess is all illusion,*
 "but the sentiments of true beauty, with
 "which it inspires us, and makes us
 "enamoured, is *real*. This beauty is
 "not in the object we doat on. It is
 "the offspring of our own delusion. Be
 "it so. What then? Are we less for-
 "ward to sacrifice every ungenerous
 "sentiment to this ideal model of per-
 "fection? Do the virtues we attribute to
 "the beloved object, make the less im-
 "pression on our minds? Do we the-
 "less endeavour to detach ourselves from
 "the selfishness of human nature? Where
 "is the true Lover, who is not ready to
 "sacrifice his life to his Mistress? And
 "how can the Man who would even re-
 "sign his life, entertain a gross or sensual
 "passion?"

LOVE

LOVE is the happy inmate of a youthful breast, converting to the most beneficial purposes the *sensual appetite*, which frequently assumes its appearance, and usurps its name; though it is as far inferior in its nature, as the body is to the soul. Love inspires the most pure, manly, and elevated sentiments into the hearts of those whom it designs to make virtuous by its influence, and happy by its presence. But no one can entertain a just conception of its energy, who has not been subject to its power. It thus far partakes of the nature of Madness, that there is a pleasure in it which none but Lovers know, or can conceive: and I am inclined to think, every other species of enthusiasm produces an effect of the same kind on its votaries.

WHETHER the object which gives rise to the passion of Love, exists in nature;

ture; whether it is, as Mr. ROUSSEAU maintains, *merely* the illusion of a youthful imagination, supposing an assemblage of beauties and excellencies in an object which does not in reality possess them; or whether the power of the Lover's imagination is exerted only in *magnifying* the charms and virtues of the beloved object, which *last* seems the most probable opinion; are questions of more difficulty than importance to determine (except to the Lover himself); since, if his passion is inspired by the ideas of beauty and virtue which he conceives to be united to some particular female, it would produce the same effect on his conduct, whether they really resided in her, or in his deluded imagination.

BUT if there is no *real* cause to produce this passion in the object itself, and it is *all* deception, how happens it that the
 imagi-

imagination cannot impose this delusion upon us, without the *co-operation* of the beloved object? That such assistance must be afforded, is evident from this consideration, that true Love cannot *exist*, unless the Lover believes his passion meets with a reciprocal return. If it be objected, that a man may be as easily deceived by his imagination suggesting to him that he *is* beloved when he is *not*, as he may in the various beauties and perfections he attributes to the object of his love; it may be answered, such a supposition can only be made by those who are ignorant of the passion; otherwise experience would convince them, that however blind the Lover might be to the imperfections or faults of his Mistress, he would be *sure* to detect her want of affection for *him*; and this is perhaps the *only* defect she could not conceal from him. This reciprocal regard must really exist in the beloved object

object herself, since it is totally beyond the power of the Lover's fancy to *create* it; and for this reason alone, Love must be something more than an *illusion*.

It may possibly be asserted by those who, because they never felt the influence of true Love, deny its existence, that a return of the passion is *not* necessary to its continuance; that, being merely *ideal*, it may remain in the mind of the Lover, though conscious he is regarded with total indifference by the object which inspires it; and that examples may be adduced in proof of this assertion.

I do not say there never was such an instance; but it is contrary to reason and experience to believe they are *frequent*; or that they can be considered in any other light than as exceptions to a general rule,
and

and extraordinary deviations from the common course of human nature.

THAT the passion of Love may, and in fact often does continue, after death has deprived the Lover of his Mistress, is no objection to my argument, provided her regard for him during her life was *reciprocal*. On the contrary, it is rather a confirmation of the opinion, that Love cannot be produced by the imagination, without the co-operation of the beloved object; for when memory presents to the Lover the idea of his Mistress who is absent or dead, the instances of her *mutual* affection are always present to his mind; and though they certainly cannot be produced by his imagination, they are preferred to every other real or ideal perfection.

BUT

BUT though this passion, nourished and sustained by the remembrance of her reciprocal affection, may survive her death, and even be strong enough to destroy her Lover, it would have been effectually subdued by her *indifference*; and imagination would have been too *weak* to continue the charm, if deprived of her powerful assistance.

MUTUAL affection is the Talisman in which the magical force of Love is contained, and when that is broken, the Enchantment is dissolved.

"Soft Love, spontaneous Tree, its parted Root

"Must from two Hearts with equal vigour shoot;

"Where each delighting, and delighted, gives

"The pleasing extacy which each receives.

"But if this Blessing angry Fate denies,

"The fading Plant bewails its lost supplies,

"Wild with despair, or sick with Grief, it dies."

PRIOR.

MR.

MR. ROUSSEAU gives a remarkable instance, from Brantôme, of a Lady, in the Court of Francis I. who imposed a silence for two years on a talkative Lover, which he religiously observed*. This example proves at once the strength of Love, and the weakness of the Lover.



THIS Volume contains many just and pertinent observations on the subject of Matrimony; and the following quotation is peculiarly worthy the attention of every woman who is solicitous to preserve her husband's regard, or even to secure herself from disgrace, contempt, and unhappiness.

“THERE is a great deal of difference
“between usurping a right of empire, and

* Page 89.

govern.

“governing him who commands.—A
 “woman’s empire is an empire of gentle-
 “ness, address, and complacency: her
 “orders are caresses, and her menaces
 “are tears. She ought to rule in her
 “family, as a Prime Minister in the state,
 “by having the art to dictate those orders
 “she would wish to receive. In this sense,
 “it is certain the best regulated families
 “are those where the wife has due influ-
 “ence. But when she pays no regard to
 “what her husband says, when she usurps
 “his prerogative, and would rule of her-
 “self, disorder and misery, shame and
 “dishonour, are the consequences*.

MR. ROUSSEAU is certainly right, in
 preferring a woman of moderate parts and
 without any education, to “a witty Lady,
 “who would come into a family to erect

* Page 133.

“a lite-

“ a literary tribunal, of which herself is
“ president.—A witty wife is a scourge to
“ her husband, her children, her friends,
“ and to all the world.”

HE makes many just and sensible observations on the necessity of instructing his Pupil “ in that dangerous period of
“ his existence between childhood and
“ manhood ; and directing to a proper
“ object, that irresistible propensity which
“ will actuate the youth, and perhaps de-
“ termine his future life.”

THIS, he justly observes, is the most necessary time for instructing and superintending the conduct of his Pupil ; though the utmost delicacy and discretion must be observed in the *manner* of performing this arduous task. For it so happens, that mankind are most ungovernable, precisely at that age when they are the least

fit to direct themselves. Mr. ROUSSEAU therefore gives a proof of his judgement, and his intimate knowledge of human nature, by supposing the Tutor of EMILIUS to appear not in the magisterial character of a Governor, or Preceptor, (titles abhorrent to the ears of youth) but to address his Pupil in the conciliating manner and language of friendship; to prove by his whole conduct and behaviour that he really is his friend; and to direct his actions by gaining his confidence, and exciting his affection, which will be easy; rather than by attempting to enforce his obedience, in which it would be impossible to succeed.—A generous youth would be *open* in his revolt against a tyrannical Pedagogue; would *despise* his commands, and reject his instructions with disdain. A mean and pusillanimous Pupil might yield a feigned obedience; but that *low* cunning inseparably connected with *base-*

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ness

ness of mind, would deceive the Preceptor's vigilance by dissimulation.

THE only method to gain the essential point of directing a youth through that dangerous and ungovernable period of his existence, is by a gentle and secret application to those invisible *springs*, whose force he ignorantly and implicitly obeys, whilst he vainly imagines he is *himself* the sole director of his actions.—He is swayed not by his reason, but by his *passions*; and it is only by gaining an ascendancy over these, that he can be commanded. This is not to be effected by violent means; for the passions of a generous youth resemble a spring of exquisite temper, which yields to a *gentle* touch, but acquires force by compression, and opposes every degree of coercive violence with increasing and collected powers of resistance.

MR. ROUSSEAU illustrates this truth by a striking example *; and on that occasion he justly observes, “that a history of the innocent loves of EMILIUS and SOPHIA would not be futile or “romantic.”—“I intend my book (says he) as an history of my own species. “You who *deprave* human nature, it is “you who turn my book into a romance †.”

At the conclusion of a very interesting scene between the Lovers ‡, EMILIUS, with an admirable degree of sensibility and manly firmness, thus addresses the Mistress of his heart :

“SOPHIA, my destiny depends on you! You know it well. You may “kill me with grief; but do not hope

* Page 141. † Ibid. ‡ Page 198 to 200.

“to make me forget the duties of humanity; they are still more sacred than those to which you have a claim, and I will never renounce them even for you.”

SOPHIA received this peremptory declaration as she ought; she loved EMILIUS, if possible, more than ever; and thought him in the highest degree worthy of her esteem, for this instance of the goodness of his heart, and the firmness of his resolution, in a cause which, on consideration, she was convinced she ought not to expect or desire he should abandon.—Had she behaved or thought differently on this trying occasion, she could not have been worthy to become the wife of EMILIUS.

MANY of the maxims contained in the excellent advice which Mr. ROUSSEAU, in this part of his work, supposes EMILIUS to

to receive from his instruction, are no less applicable to *Man* in his several relations and situations in civil society, than to EMILIUS in particular. The first that occurs, is in a peculiar manner worthy the serious attention of every human being; and is an infallible rule for our conduct on many occasions. "While we are ignorant of our duty, it is the part of wisdom to remain in-
 "active*." The impatience and aversion to inactivity incident to the mind of Man, especially in the early part of life, induce him *precipitately* to resolve on adopting some particular mode of conduct, on every circumstance in the event of which his welfare may be concerned; not considering, that there are many cases in which it is certainly his wisest method to *suspend* his determination, and remain a passive, though an interested and attentive

* Page 203.

spectator of events, which are likely to intervene before he is absolutely necessitated to fix on *any* plan of action, and by the determination of which he might be induced to pursue a mode of conduct very different from what he would otherwise have done; or perhaps be clearly convinced that his wisest course was to remain inactive.

THE following quotation, though it has a manifest connection, is taken from different parts of this fourth volume. But as the author's sentiments appear so exactly conformable to truth, so applicable to the state of human nature, and so nearly coincide with my own ideas; I chuse to express them in his strong, perspicuous and elegant language, well knowing they would suffer by any alteration I should attempt to make.

“ You

" You are not afraid of pain or death ;
 " you can submit to the laws of necessity
 " in physical evils : but you have not yet
 " learned to subdue your appetites ; and
 " it is from them, more than from our
 " real wants, that all the misery of our
 " life proceeds. Our desires are unlimited ;
 " our power of resistance weak. Man,
 " by means of his desires, is attached to
 " a thousand objects ; and yet, of him-
 " self, he is not sure of securing one, not
 " even his own life ; the more he enlarges
 " his attachments, the more he increases
 " his troubles. Every thing in life is
 " transient : every thing we are fond of,
 " we must abandon sooner or later ; and
 " yet we attach ourselves to them, as if
 " we were sure of possessing them to
 " Eternity.

" Thus abandoned to inordinate pas-
 " sions, how many objects of uneasiness do

"Men create themselves! Always exposed
 "to disappointments, losses and alarms,
 "they will not enjoy the little comforts
 "they have left. The fear of losing all,
 "will prevent their enjoying any thing.
 "By resigning themselves entirely to their
 "passions, they put it out of their power
 "to gratify them *."

"THERE is no happiness to be attained
 "without resolution, nor any virtue with-
 "out struggle. The word *virtue* implies
 "resolution; resolution is the foundation
 "of every virtue. Virtue is only to be
 "attained by a Being whom nature has
 "formed *weak*, but whom resolution has
 "made powerful. In this consists the
 "merit of a virtuous Man; and though
 "we call God *just*, we do not call Him

* Page 207.

"virtu-

"*virtuous*, because he finds no difficulty
" in acting right *."

" WHO then is the Man of Virtue ?
" He who can subdue his affections. For
" in so doing he pursues the dictates of
" reason, conscience, and duty ; he ad-
" heres to a regular plan, from which no-
" thing can tempt him to deviate. Hither-
" to you have been free in appearance
" only : you enjoyed the precarious
" liberty of a slave, who has not yet re-
" ceived his master's commands. Be now
" actually free ; learn to be your own
" master ; govern your affections, EMI-
" LIUS, and you will be virtuous †.

" BE a Man ! Confine your affections
" within the limits of your condition.
" Study and learn those limits ; however

* Page 208. † Ibid.

“ narrow they may be, we are never un-
 “ happy while we keep within them, but
 “ only when we exceed them. We are
 “ unhappy when our inordinate desires
 “ make us aspire after impossibilities; we
 “ are unhappy when we forget the con-
 “ dition of human nature, to form an
 “ imaginary existence, from which we
 “ always drop into our own. The
 “ only pleasures we are unwilling to
 “ quit, are those we think we are able to
 “ enjoy. We are easily detached from
 “ those we think it impossible to attain *.

“ THE delusions of pride are the four-
 “ ces of our greatest misfortunes; but
 “ the consideration of the miseries of hu-
 “ man nature always make a wise Man
 “ moderate. He preserves his station;
 “ he is not restless to leave it; he does

* Page 210 and 211.

“ not endeavour in vain to acquire what
 “ he cannot secure; and applying his at-
 “ tention to enjoy what he has, he is in
 “ fact more rich and powerful, in pro-
 “ portion as his desires are more moderate
 “ than ours.

“ SHALL a mortal and perishable Being
 “ attempt to form an everlasting attach-
 “ ment on this earth, where every thing
 “ fluctuates, where every thing decays,
 “ and from which he may be removed:
 “ to-morrow!

“ WOULD you live happily and dis-
 “ creetly, attach your mind to those
 “ beauties which never decay: let your
 “ desires be limited by your condition;
 “ let your duty go hand in hand with your
 “ inclinations; extend the law of necessity
 “ to moral accidents; learn to bear the
 “ loss of every thing which you may be
 K 6 “ depriv-

“deprived of; learn to renounce every
“thing at the command of Virtue; to raise
“your mind superior to accidents; to detach
“your heart without breaking it; to be
“courageous in adversity; in a word,
“learn never to be unhappy, to perse-
“vere in your duty, in short never to be
“criminal. You will then be happy in
“spite of Fortune, and prudent in spite
“of your Passions. Then you will find
“a pleasure even in the fruition of pre-
“carious transports, which nothing can
“interrupt; you will enjoy them with-
“out their engrossing you; and you will
“perceive that Man, who is subject to lose
“every thing, enjoys that only which he
“knows how to renounce.

“You will pass your days without
“trouble, and end them without terror; you
“will quit life with the same ease that
“you renounce other enjoyments. Let

“ others, seized with dread, think their
 “ being at an end, when they leave this
 “ World ; you, who know the true worth
 “ of existence, will think it does but
 “ begin. Death closes the life of the
 “ Wicked, and gives birth to that of
 “ the Just *.”

“ EVERY thing incident to human na-
 “ ture partakes of its decay ; every thing
 “ in this life is finite and transitory ; and
 “ even if the condition which makes us
 “ happy were to last for ever, *habit*
 “ would deprive us of our taste for it.
 “ If externals remain the same, our af-
 “ fections change : happiness leaves us,
 “ or we renounce it †.”

THE maxim, “ that Habit deprives
 “ us of our taste for the pleasures of this

* Page 211 and 212. † Page 214.

“ life.”

“ life,” though it is certainly just in some instances, is notwithstanding liable to numerous exceptions. Many of those pleasures and enjoyments which Mankind with so much eagerness seek to obtain, owe their estimation entirely to *Habit*; and long possession or frequent repetition, instead of disgusting us, only increases our regard for them, and enhances their value.

THE pleasures of the Table—of the Bottle—of Gaming—of Dress—of Pomp and Equipage, and many others of an inferior kind, which are so anxiously coveted, and so highly esteemed by the generality of the World, receive their imaginary charms from the fascinating power of Custom. Many of them are entered into at first with indifference, and some with dislike, which is overcome by a desire of complying with the prevailing fashion

fashion of the time or place in which we live, or of the companions with whom we associate. But the triumph of Habit over Nature is soon rendered complete; that which at first was disgusting, by frequent repetition becomes agreeable; those objects we formerly looked upon with abhorrence, we now contemplate with pleasure; and those customs we acquired with reluctance, we cannot relinquish without regret.

MR. POPE, in one of his Ethic Epistles, gives many strong and remarkable instances of the powerful influence of the *ruling passion* over the human mind, extended even to the latest period of life. The beautiful illustration with which he concludes this Epistle, reflects equal honour on the Poet and the Patriot:

“ And thou, brave COBHAM! to thy latest breath

“ Shalt find thy ruling Passion strong in Death;

“ Such

"Such in those moments, as in all the past:

"O! save my Country, Heaven! shall be thy last*."

BUT if we examine from whence the predominant *foible* which distinguished the various persons he has rendered immortally ridiculous, derived its powerful influence, we shall find in most of them it acquired more strength from *Custom* than from Nature, and might with greater propriety be termed the *Ruling Habit*, than the *Ruling Passion*.

THE tyranny of Custom over the human understanding is more severe and humiliating than that of the Passions, because it is frequently no less repugnant to nature than to reason; and it is more prejudicial in its consequences, because its power is continually *increasing*; while the impulse of the Passions, however strong, is but temporary, and seldom of long duration.

* Book II. Epistle I.

I WILL

I WILL endeavour to prove this by an example, which must frequently have occurred, even to superficial observers of human nature.

Nothing is more common than for a Youth of a vigorous and warm constitution, to be totally regardless of the voice of reason, and to abandon himself entirely to the domination of his inordinate desires. Implicitly following their dictates, he seeks for happiness in scenes of lawless riot, and indulges his inclination in the most unbounded practice of lascivious debauchery, till his cloyed appetite *loaths* what it lately coveted. Nature, in him *unrestrained* by reason, would in a short time *repair* her *own* error, and produce his reformation.

His fatiated appetite and debilitated constitution would convince him, that
pleasure

pleasure does not consist in debauchery; that the frequency and variety of his excesses have produced nothing but illness and disgust; and that *moderation* is the true means to obtain felicity.

BUT will the voice of Nature, unaided by reason, be sufficient to produce a lasting alteration in his conduct? By no means.—For though he may be *free* from the dominion of his passions, he is a slave to the tyranny of Custom. In the pursuit of his licentious debaucheries, he has acquired from his associates many evil *habits*, among which is that of *gaming*; a vice *intirely* derived from *Custom*, and totally repugnant to Nature, being equally destructive to health of body and tranquility of mind.—This vice therefore, being independent on his natural appetites, cannot be restrained by satiety; and excess increasing instead of abating its influence,
it

it will "stick to the last sand," unless some means can be devised to deprive him of the ability to gratify it, till reason regains the ascendant in his breast.

By this instance, the superiority of the power of Custom over that of natural appetite, evidently appears; and though it would be an absurd affectation of singularity, to oppose Customs which are in themselves indifferent, it behoves every man to be guarded against those which are manifestly wrong; since there cannot be a more disgraceful instance of human weakness, than thus to debase our nature, and submit our reason to be influenced by the most abject, servile, and unmanly motives of action, and to be enslaved by a tyrant which we at once obey and despise.

YET

YET where is the Man who does not bow the knee to this haughty Baal? Custom, superior to Nature, to Reason, nay even to *Appetite* itself, exercises unbounded dominion over the actions and opinions of Mankind. The Habits which are acquired in youth,

Grow with our growth, and strengthen with our strength:

and they generally determine the conduct and the character of the Man.

It is therefore of the most material consequence, that during the course of Education, and at a period of life when the mind is susceptible of any impression, the utmost care should be taken to instil good Habits, and eradicate those which are bad.

THE natural disposition of Man is humane, generous and good, and the depravity

pravity so universally complained of, arises, in a great measure, from *Custom*. Good habits and propensities might be encouraged with great facility, if Education was conducted on the principles of reason; if it was extended to *manners*, as well as erudition; and prescribed laws to *Fashion*, instead of being directed by it.

BUT while it is subservient to the power it ought to controul, it increases instead of lessening the evil; the primary intent of its institution is defeated, and its authority is prostituted to *sanctify* those enormities it ought to restrain.



THE Dissertation on Travelling (which begins at page 222, and continues to page 270) contains many just strictures on the improper method of Travelling pursued by

by the Youth of the different European Nations.

MR. ROUSSEAU, in this Essay, takes occasion to enter minutely into the subject of civil polity; and considers the comparative benefits and disadvantages of the three different forms of Government distinguished by the appellations of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and their complex variations. He also investigates the origin of Government, and justly explodes the absurd and slavish doctrine of Divine or Hereditary Right to exercise Tyranny.

THIS however seems, in the *present Age*, to be unnecessary trouble; for as Mankind are not disposed to believe that any *Individual*, or any body of Men, has *now*, or ever had, a *right* to exercise Tyranny, or to govern a people contrary

to

to their consent, it must follow *à fortiori*, that the notion of hereditary right is absurd and groundless; since no Man can *transmit* to his descendants that which he never possessed.

MR. ROUSSEAU'S sentiments respecting civil Government appear, in general, to be just, liberal, and rational; though in some instances not a little whimsical*. But as it is by no means my intention to enter into a discussion of the opinions he has advanced on this subject, I shall hasten to the conclusion of his Work, and my Remarks.



THE following observation is certainly true: "To know the real characteristics of a people, you must observe them in the *country* †."

* See Page 252 to 256. † Page 266.

It gives me great satisfaction to find my opinion respecting the powerful influence of the passion of *true Love* on young minds, and the beneficial effects it produces, confirmed by so respectable an authority as that of Mr. ROUSSEAU; and though I do not mean to add any thing further on the subject, his sentiments, as he expresses them in page 267, so exactly coincide with what I have *already* observed, that I cannot omit inserting the passage. "We are in general strangers to the effects of true Love on the inclinations of young people. It is however necessary that a young man should be a Lover, or he will be a Debauchee."

THE little History of Lord JOHN and LUCY* affords a pleasing and pertinent

* Page 269.

instance

instance of the effects of true love on young and virtuous minds.

MR. ROUSSEAU concludes his useful and very ingenious Work with the birth of the first child of EMILIUS and SOPHIA; and the request of the former to be directed by his Tutor in its education*.

As it is not my present intention to make any further Remarks on this celebrated performance, it only remains to intreat from the impartial public, a candid perusal of this imperfect Essay, which I shall conclude by extracting the following remarkable passage from my author:

“It is in vain that Mankind aspire
“after Liberty while under the govern-

* Page 292.

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“ment

"ment of Laws. Laws! do I say?
 "Must I not ask where the true spirit of
 "Laws is to be found, and where they
 "are respected? Do not we every where
 "see private interest and passions prevail,
 "under that sacred name? The fixed
 "and eternal Laws of Nature and Order,
 "however, still exist. These are the
 "Statutes of the Wise; these are written
 "in the Heart by Reason and Conscience:
 "it is to these we should be subservient,
 "in order to be truly free; the vicious
 "Man only being a *Slave*, as he is vi-
 "cious in spite of his better Reason, and in
 "condemnation of himself. Liberty does
 "not exist in any certain form of Govern-
 "ment, but in the Heart of Man. The
 "wicked bear the chains of their bon-
 "dage constantly about them; and it is
 "possible for one Man to be a *slave* at
 "Geneva, and for another to be *free* even
 "in Paris."

F I N I S.

